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INTERVENTION:

BUILDING LEGITIMACY BY CONFRONTING OUR PAST - AN
OPEN LETTER*

-

We leave a century ofunparalleledsuffering andviolence.... If
the collective conscience ofhumanity-a conscience which abhors
cruelty, renounces injustice and seeks peace for all peoples
cannotfind in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a
grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for
justice. . . . [I]ntervention must be based on legitimate and
universal principles if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the
world's peoples.
Secretary-General Kofi Annant
Dear Mr. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Distinguished Members
of the United Nations:
We celebrate the work and dedication of the United Nations and we are
encouraged and hopeful for a peaceful future made possible by a

commitment to promoting individual human rights.
We are law students at the University of Florida Levin College of Law
as well as former students of Professor Sherrie Russell-Brown's
International Organizations course? We respectfully write this "open
letter" to share with you some concerns and suggestions based upon the
insights we have about the United Nations gained in that class, specifically
in regard to the controversy surrounding the U.N. role in Humanitarian
Intervention. We concluded that decisions with respect to Humanitarian
Intervention have been tainted by U.N. member states' fears of military
losses, now termed the "Somalia Syndrome," subdued racial motivations,
and the political will of more powerful U.N. member states.

* This letter is from Danette Zaghari-Mask, Sabina Tomshinsky, and Tosha Fernandez,
students in the University of Florida Levin College of Law International Organizations Course.
Please note that this Open Letter was completed in November 2003.
1. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999).
2. We would like to thank Professor Russell-Brown for awakening within us the realization
that human rights are the most noble endeavor one could strive to support. Professor RussellBrown's direction, guidance, and respect for her students have embedded in us a passion for the
basic humanitarian rights of all peoples.
483
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I. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

As you know, the United Nations recognizes the value in human rights
by first acknowledging human dignity. This is articulated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) and its two progeny, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). These documents are often termed the International Bill of
Rights, and rightly so, because they give credence to the principle that
individuals now are the subjects and not the objects of international law.3
These documents articulate an important principle that states now owe
duties to their citizenry both within their borders and outside their

borders.4

The United Nations was a bold and courageous transformation from the
workings of the League of Nations.' Within the League of Nations,
sovereignty was defined as an impenetrable wall which gave states power
to keep out aid from other states.' Individuals could be tortured and denied
equal rights within a state's borders without facing scrutiny from other
nations.' Now, the United Nations continues to search for solutions to
conflicts the world over. In that noble purpose, as you know, the Security
Council (S.C.) plays a central role.'
We recognize the awesome burden that the S.C. faces in exercising its
powers under the ongoing scrutiny of the international community. We
recognize that while the U.N. Charter spells out those powers, it does not
provide a road map for how consistency should be attained. New times call
for new responses to age-old conflicts. Each conflict presents unique
challenges and yet the S.C. must seek a uniform way to respond in order

3. H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INCONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS, 147-48 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2d

ed. 2000).
4. Id. at 651-52.
5. ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
5(2001).
6. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 148 (Lauterpacht recognizes that outdated legal traditions
such as the League of Nations did not recognize the rights of the governed within the sovereign but
only the rights of the sovereign state itself).
7. See generally id. (The failure of the League of Nations can be partly attributed to the rise
of nationalism after World War I and unwavering adherence to the international norm of absolute
sovereignty. The United Nations was a success over the League ofNations because the Nuremburg
Tribunal after World War II established individual responsibility and also made individuals the
subjects of international law. This in turn led to the U.N. Charter, the International Bill of Rights,
and other Conventions that put the focus on individuals as the subject of rights).
8. See generally http://www.un.org (explaining the relationship between U.N. organs).
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to secure the legitimacy of the international coalition.' In retrospect,
evaluating the actions of the S.C. regarding Humanitarian Intervention
provides insight for mapping out a course for a uniform legal
methodology. 10 In any celebrated legal tradition consistency is the
foundation on which justice survives.
We turn our attention to the S.C. powers as spelled out in the U.N.
Charter. We recognize that in the exercise of those powers, the

international community must balance the interest of a state's sovereignty
against an individual's right to the freedoms and protections which the
United Nations has vowed to protect and develop." We desire to
respectfully articulate our view regarding that balance as citizens who are
vested in the security and progress of the international community, but as
students, we are humbled by the awesome work and responsibility of the
institution we undertake to examine.
To begin our analysis, we examined similar conflicts in which there
were inconsistent applications of Chapter VII powers (Chapter VII allows
U.N. actions that would appear to breach a state's sovereignty) in
deploying Humanitarian Intervention missions. We address how such
inconsistencies in the exercise of Chapter VII powers can be remedied in
light of scholarly works on the subject and from our own attempts to
formulate a solution.
First, we turned to the U.N. Charter to inform ourselves regarding the
express powers from which the S.C. proceeds when deploying a
Humanitarian Intervention mission. The Charter spells out in Chapter I,
Articles 2(4) and 2(7), that the international community must respect the
territorial integrity of each state.12 Nonintervention is a central theme in the
Charter such that no state may proceed with force across another state's
borders unless one of two exceptions apply: one, for reasons of selfdefense," and two, whenever the S.C. exercises its Chapter VII powers.14
Furthermore, Chapter VII requires either a "threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression." 5 The Charter establishes a balance such
that a state's right to protect itself against intrusive confrontation is
weighed against a population's right to be free from human rights abuses."1
9. Tania Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian
Intervention: Lessons From East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 31, 32

(2002).
10.
Beyond,
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and
15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 575-81 (1994).
Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 148; DRINAN, supra note 5, at 3.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, 7.
Id art. 51.
Id. art. 39.
Id.

16. Bartram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention andKosovo: HumanitarianIntervention

at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2000) (".
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II. THE "SOVEREIGNTY" ARGUMENT
One of the reasons the principle of Humanitarian Intervention has been
controversial is because it contradicts sovereignty, the central pillar of
international law, which is embodied in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter." The former contains the "principle of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of states" and the latter the "principle of non-use of

force."'"
Some scholars hold the sovereignty principle so highly that they would
allow human rights violations to reach catastrophic levels before they
would accept a Humanitarian Intervention as legitimate.'9 Such a blind
reverence of the sovereignty principle serves only to protect weaker states
from the hegemony of more powerful states. 20 Proponents of this
sovereignty principle maintain that intervention in the absence of
enormous atrocity only further erodes the "sacred" sovereignty of the
target state. 2 1
Another approach to the application of state sovereignty allows for
human dignity to reign supreme by distinguishing popular sovereignty
from state sovereignty.22 If state sovereignty depends on popular
sovereignty, then human rights violations transgress the sovereignty ofthe
people, which then must be stopped.2" From this standpoint, an
intervention seeks only to restore the status quo and does not violate the
sovereignty principle."
As students of international law, we considered that although at a
glance these principles of sovereignty and nonintervention appear to be in
conflict with Humanitarian Intervention, a more careful analysis would

humanitarian intervention must also try to reconcile two types of human rights: those of the victims
one might hope to protect through intervention on the one hand, and the collective human right of
self-determination, which is corollary of the principle of nonintervention, on the other."); see also
Yvonne C. Lodico, The Justification For Humanitarian Intervention: Will The Continent Matter?,

35 INT'L LAW. 1027,1032 (2001) (discussing whether the enforcement of human rights diminishes
sovereign power).
17. David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine ofHumanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL.
L. REV. 253, 259 (1992).
18. Id. at 260, 264.
19. A. Mark Weisburd, International Law and the Problem ofEvil, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 225, 253-54 (2001).
20. Id. at 257.
21. Id.
22. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 148.
23. Id.
24. Michael L. Burton, Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEO. L.J. 417, 434 (1996).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss2/6

4

AN Nations
OPEN LETTER
KOFI ANNAN
Zaghari-Mask et al.: The United
andTOHumanitarian
Intervention: Building Legiti
487
20041

reveal that this is not the case." We found that the principle of
Humanitarian Intervention has actually been in existence for centuries. 26
Though there are some who dismiss the principle of Humanitarian
Intervention as being a tool for undermining the independence of other
states, it is still a lawful concept under customary international law.27 The
rapid growth of international human rights law since the end of World War
II as well as the proliferation of various international organizations and
treaties that focus on human rights have made this an undisputable fact. 28
By joining international organizations such as the United Nations and
treaties such as the ICCPR and ICESCR, the member states agree to cede
some of their territorial sovereignty; however, even if states are unwilling
to become members of such international bodies, they still do not possess
absolute sovereignty if human rights are at stake. 29
The former U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar has
reiterated this point when he said that "the case for not impinging on the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States is by
itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were to carry
the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the
right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of
decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of
controlling civil strife or insurrection." 30 Today, over a decade after Perez
25. Michael J. Reppas, The Lawfulness ofHumanitarianIntervention,9 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
463, 469 (1997).
26. Malvina Halberstam, The Legality ofHumanitarianIntervention,3 CARDOZO J. INT'L&
COMP. L. 2-3 (1995) ("Grotius, writing in 1625, asked 'whether a war for the subjects of another
be just, for the purpose of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler,' and answered that
it is just if 'a tyrant . .. practices atrocities towards his subjects which no just man can approve."').
27. Id. at 3.
28. Reppas, supra note 25, at 469-70; see Ruth E. Gordon, HumanitarianIntervention by the

&

United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 43, 46 (1996) ("Traditionally the
international community viewed the manner in which a state treated its citizens as an internal
matter that was within a state's sovereign authority. Over the last fifty years, however, the emerging
law of international human rights has modified this perception, and these matters have become a
subject of international scrutiny and concern."); see Ravi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the
Principle of Nonintervention With the Right of HumanitarianIntervention, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L.
FOREIGN AFF. 221, 263 (1996) ("As the twentieth century has progressed, the duty of each State
to observe a basic respect for human rights, and to refrain from violating them in a manner which
'shocks the conscience of mankind' or poses a 'threat to peace and security' has become a litmus
test for the continued respect of sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention").
29. Reppas, supra note 25, at 469-70; see Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 253 ("[T]he U.N.
now openly acknowledges that sovereignty is not absolute and that there must be some
accommodation between States to address transnational problems.")
30. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 262 (quoting what then-U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez
de Cuellar said at the University of Bordeaux in April 1991 and in his annual report on the work
of the United Nations in September 1991. The importance of Perez de Cuellar's words lies in how
he stressed "the importance of striking a balance between the rights of States, as confirmed by the
Charter, and the rights of the individual, as confirmed by the Universal Declaration on Human
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de Cuellar spoke these words, they are still true." It is clear that "the
protection of human rights has now become one of the keystones in the
arch of peace." 32 The scales have definitely "tipped in favor of
humanitarianism and against absolute sovereignty."" The "international
interest in universalizing a regime of human rights" has been the "most
welcome shift in public attitudes. To try to resist it would be politically as
unwise as it is morally indefensible."" That is, states exist only to
"preserve, protect and advance the natural rights of human beings."" Thus,
if a state chooses to disrespect human rights, it loses its legitimacy and
foreign states then acquire a right to intervene on behalf of those whose
rights are being violated. 36 It would indeed be unwise for a state to
contravene human rights norms and thus unleash upon itself the wrath of
the world in the form of Humanitarian Intervention - such an intervention
would only symbolize to the world that the target state has lost its
international legitimacy, and with it, whatever sovereignty it possessed.
In our discussion, the unanimous conclusion was that all conflicts
regarding the infringement on human rights, as carved out in the

Rights and other human rights conventions"); see Gordon, supra note 28, at 46; see Reppas, supra
note 25, at 468.
31. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 262; see Reppas, supra note 25, at 466, 468; see Mel Gurtov
& Ellen Mekjavich, Responding to Humanitarian Crises, 25 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB.
POL'Y, 507, 512-13 (2001) ("Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an international norm against
the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of State
sovereignty" (quoting Kofi Annan's Commencement Address to the University of Michigan in
April, 1999)).
32. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 262 (quoting former Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar); see
Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 253 ("[P]rotecting human rights may not only be consistent with
sovereignty, but also may be necessary for the survival of many multi-ethnic States. The human
rights consequences of internal conflict threaten to undermine the very foundation of the
international society of nation-states").
33. Reppas, supra note 25, at 468 ("The principle of nonintervention that is emerging today
is not as traditional in scope as it used to be. The balance has shifted from pro-sovereignty to prohuman rights").
34. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 262-63 (quoting former Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar);
see Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 245, 263 ("[H]uman rights issues have international effects and
belong within the international sphere of debate. . . . International law now recognizes with little
reservation that human rights is an international issue and may be a legitimate basis for
intervention").
35. Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 237.
36. Id. at 236-37.
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UNDHR3 7 and its two progeny, the ICCPR 38 and the ICESCR, 39 are
international in scope. At a glance, it may seem that the gory details of a
domestic conflict have not spilled over into a neighboring state, but upon
deeper examination it is possible to understand the ripple effect of that
domestic conflict. 40 One well-known problem is that of refugee spillover. 41 Then there is the gradual erosion of human rights norms, a result
of the aggregate effect of many states acquiescing to transgressions. We
looked for an illustration of the aggregate effect in our own domestic legal
tradition, recognizing that international legal principles can be related to
our own domestic legal tradition.
The most obvious example in United States jurisprudence is Wickard
v. Filburn.42 In Wickard, a farmer planted more than his allotted quota of
wheat, in violation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1938 43
The purpose of the AAA was to stabilize the national economy.44 The
farmer refused to pay the penalty charged, claiming that his activity only
indirectly affected the national economy.45 The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the farmer's activities on his own territory had a
direct effect on the national economy. 46 The Court reasoned that the
farmer's activities, when combined with similar violations in other
jurisdictions would result in an outcome contrary to the grand design.4
The aggregate effect doctrine, as applied in the international law
context, teaches us that we must look at substantial human rights violations
within a sovereign's borders in the context of similar violations which are
occurring elsewhere. Humanitarian Intervention must be applied
consistently so as not to allow one brutal dictator to undermine the
international human rights regime. A superficial analysis might lead to a
laissez-faire international solution, yet we feel that a deeper analysis

37. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948).
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
39. International Covenant on Edonomic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR].
40. Keith L. Sellen, The UnitedNations Security Council Veto in the New World Order, 138
MIL. L. REv. 187, 206, 208 (1992) (maintaining that all conflicts are international).
41. Gordon, supra note 10, at 578.
42. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
43. Id. at I14-15.
44. Id. at 115.
45. Id. at 118-20.
46. Id. at 132-33.
47. Id. at 129.
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would reveal that the aggregate effect works in conflict with the
international design created to foster international peace and security.48
Finally, on the point of sovereignty, we discussed the consequence of
globalization that has made states progressively more dependent on each
other for the preservation of their respective economies, environment and
a stable outward-looking political climate. 49 Therefore, even in the absence
of the aggregate effect, the relationship between states in the modern era
is such that a humanitarian crisis in any region of the world can infect any
state's modus operandi.

III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: CASE STUDIES
We examined three decades of internal strife and noted conflicts that
were similar yet where Humanitarian Intervention missions were not
deployed consistently. We examined the role of the S.C., or lack thereof,
in each conflict and discussed possible reasons for unpredictability in its
actions. A number of reasons surfaced, namely the "Somalia Syndrome,"
racial disparity and political will. We discovered that Humanitarian
Intervention missions do not seem to be evenly deployed between
oppressed white populations on the European continent and oppressed

brown populations on other continents." We are deeply concerned that
inconsistencies in the responses to similar conflicts have either led the
international community to lose faith in the integrity and stamina of the
United Nations or have instead encouraged a politicized atmosphere where
inconsistencies are being nourished.
A. Iraq
The Cold War political climate rendered the United Nations largely
inchoate.5 2 A spirit of cooperation that followed at the end of the Cold War
was well illustrated in the textbook case of the international coalition's
condemnation of Iraq's treatment of its Kurd population, further

48. Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the UN. Security Council in ProtectingHuman Rights
in Crisis Situations: UN. HumanitarianIntervention in the Post Cold War World, 3 TUL. 1. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1,2 (1995) (enumerating two purposes of the United Nations; one, to maintain
"international peace and security" and two, to promote and encourage "human rights").
49. See Sellen, supra note 40, at 208.
50. Id. at 190 ("The members of that community should take this opportunity to consider
critically whether the world has entered an era in which each nation comfortably can sacrifice
considerable self-interest to promote collective interest").
51. R.C. Longworth, When Does a Real Superpower Intervene? When It Can, And When It
Should, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1999, at IC; see also infra Parts III.A-III.J.
52. Lodico, supra note 16, at 1027.
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aggravated by its 1991 invasion of Kuwait." Iraq's suppression of the Iraqi
Kurds' rebellion against Saddam Hussein's regime in the aftermath of the
Persian Gulf War posed a great refugee crisis for both Turkey and Iran."4
In order to suppress the rebellion, Hussein's forces also committed gross
human rights violations against the Kurd population in Northern Iraq."
However, it was mostly the fear that the massive flows of refugees into
neighboring states could further destabilize the already volatile region that
prompted the United Nations to act despite the language of Article 2(7).56
Although at the time, the matter was perceived to be within Iraq's
domestic jurisdiction, the United Nations justified its intervention by
depicting the pending refugee crisis as a matter with international
implications and thus an international matter warranting intervention.s
While Resolution 688 did not explicitly evoke Chapter VII, the Resolution
was still groundbreaking because it allowed the United Nations to
intervene in a solely internal conflict without the consent of the target
state.58 Although no express mention was made of Chapter VII powers,
Resolution 688 condemned Iraq's invasion and demanded that Iraq
establish relations and cooperate with human rights relief networks. 59 In
hindsight, Resolution 688 paved the way for the development of
"Humanitarian Intervention" as a mechanism for halting gross human
rights violations in internal conflicts in the future.6*
B. Somalia
Since a 1969 military coup brought Siad Barre to power, he has ruled
Somalia with rampant corruption while at the same time playing the two
Cold War superpowers against each other to benefit his own regime.61
53. Fernando R. Teson, Collective HumanitarianIntervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'LL. 323, 34446 (1996) (discussing Resolutions 687 and 688 wherein condemnation was made concerning Iraqi
aggression and oppression, and humanitarian relief was proscribed, yet the mission was never
labeled a Humanitarian Intervention mission under S.C. Chapter VII powers); see generally
SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 317 (2002).

54. Gordon, supra note 10, at 546-48.
55. Id. at 547.
56. Id. at 548-49.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 549. (In the past, "consent has been the basis for jurisdiction in the absence of
chapter VII enforcement measures").
59. Teson, supra note 53, at 344; see also Lillich,supra note 47, at 6-8.
60. Although not consistently, the United Nations has intervened under the rubric of
"Humanitarian Intervention" in order to halt human rights abuses in internal conflicts in Haiti and
Somalia while regional defense organizations have similarly acted in Kosovo, Liberia and Sierra
Leone.
61. See Ved P. Nanda et al., Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia

-Revisiting the Validity ofHumanitarian Intervention under InternationalLaw-Part 11, 26 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827, 831 (1998).
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When the Cold War ended, Barre's political position greatly deteriorated
as his people grew increasingly discontent with his rule amid ever-present
pandemic starvation. 62 By 1991, the country was immersed in a fullfledged civil war as inter-clan rivalries flared up, with four main rebel
groups emerging as the dominant actors; each made destructive grabs for
governmental power, ultimately resulting in complete government
collapse. 63 These rebel groups, each representing different Somali clans,
bitterly fought for control over Somalia while ignoring how the immense
devastation of their civil war worked only to exacerbate the destruction of
Somalia, which was already suffering from natural disasters, and hence
further destabilized the already volatile African continent at large."
Pictures of starving and dying Somali children, broadcast by reporters
brave enough to enter Somalia, shamed the international community into
responding to the crisis. 65
On December 3, 1994, one year after the first attempt to secure the
delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the S.C. for the first time directly
referred to its Chapter VII powers when it issued Resolution 794,
authorizing the use of force for humanitarian reasons in what was a
completely internal civil war.66 Because of the limited resources of the
United Nations, the S.C. authorized the United States to lead an
intervention, labeled the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which operated
in conjunction with a previously commissioned mission, United Nations
Operation in Somalia I (UNISOM I).67 UNITAF's mission was to create
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. PATRICK BROGAN, WORLD CONFLICTS, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO WORLD STRIFE

SINCE 1949 101-102 (1998); United Nations Operation In Somalia I, UNISOM I [hereinafter

Somalia], available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co mission/unosomi.htm (last visited
Jan. 21, 2004). Some of the background text on the web site is credited on the site as adapted from
the "Blue Helmets" - A Review of the United Nations Peacekeeping. This is a U.N. sales
publication offered in December 1996.
65. BROGAN, supra note 64, at 101.
66. See Teson, supra note 53, at 349; Frank Crigler, JFQ Forum, The Peace-Enforcement
Dilemma, Autumn 1993 (while the United Nations (and the United States) contemplated
humanitarian response to the crisis, 300,000 civilians, including children, perished and 4.2 million
faced starvation and disease-related death), at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfqpubs/jfq 1002.pdf
(last visited June 7, 2004); Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 833; see also United Nations Operation
in Somalia II [hereinafter Somalia I], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
co_mission/unosom2.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
67. Somalia I, supra note 64; Crigler, supra note 66 (UNISOM I was commissioned by the
United Nations to operate a mission of"50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel, up to 719
logistic support personnel" and 200 international civilian staff to monitor a cease-fire in
Mogadishu, provide the U.N. protection, and to escort humanitarian aid to Mogadishu and the
surrounding areas. Later, UNISOM I mission was expanded to escort humanitarian aid convoys to
all of Somalia. Even with UNISOM I in full operation and operating under the expanded mission,
by December of 1992, the United Nations found it necessary to establish UNITAF.).
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a secure environment for humanitarian aid to come in.68 Once aid was
entering the country, the United States became reluctant to remain
militarily involved in Somalia, as rebel groups were once again picking up
arms.69 When the United States stated that it would call UNITAF troops
home, the United Nations authorized a second military intervention of
U.N. troops, labeled the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM
II).7o UNISOM II was supposed to be a phased-in transition from UNITAF
and was given the mandate of enforcing cease-fire agreements,
maintaining a secure environment for aid to continue, aiding in
disarmament and assisting with nation-building undertaken by the United
Nations. 7 1
After an attack that killed 25 Pakistani soldiers who were part of the
UNISOM II force, the S.C. passed Resolution 837, authorizing UNISOM
II to take more drastic measures including arrest, detention and
prosecution of all responsible parties including the clan leader, General
Aideed. 2 During the investigation and prosecution of the attack, many
local citizens were killed by UNISOM II troops." On October 3, 1993,
during the investigation of the Pakistani deaths, two U.S. military
helicopters were shot down.74 Television news broadcast film footage of
angry Somalis dancing on the downed helicopters and abusing the bodies
of slain American soldiers.7" Eighteen U.S. soldiers died and seventy-five
were wounded from the events of October 3, 1993.76 Consequently, the
United States withdrew its forces fearing further American casualties and
other nations soon followed suit." During the entire Somalia mission, U.S.
deaths totaled 30 with 175 wounded.7 8 In 1995, UNISOM II troops finally
conceded the failure of the mission and completely withdrew from
Somalia. 79 Initially, the U.N. mission was a failure because of a slow
response and lack of resources, thereby causing dependence on the United
States.8 0 Once UNISOM II had taken over UNITAF, the troops lacked
clear goals, a clear command structure and adequate resources.
68. Somalia I, supra note 64 (UNISOM I was already operational in Somalia when the United
Nations voted using Chapter VII powers to create UNITAF after UNISOM I troops could not
secure the nation.).
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Somalia II, supra note 66.
Somalia I, supra note 64; see generally POWER, supra note 53.
Somalia I, supra note 64; Somalia II, supra note 66.
Somalia II, supra note 66.

74. Id
75. BROGAN, supra note 64, at 102; Somalia II, supranote 66.
76. Somalia II, supra note 66.

77. Id
78. BROGAN, supra note 64, at 102.

79. Somalia II, supra note 66.
80. Crigler, supra note 66.
81. Id at 67.
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The Humanitarian Intervention mission in Somalia was landmark

because it was the first time that the United Nations authorized a Chapter
VII intervention prompted by pure humanitarian concerns although the
conflict appeared to be completely internal. 2 However, the slow response,
the lack of clear direction and command structure, the lack of U.N.
resources and the heavy dependence on the United States all led to the
failure of the mission.8 3 Regrettably, the chief failure of the Somalia
mission was that the death of U.S. forces gave birth to the "Somalia
Syndrome" which would prove to be a major roadblock for all future
Humanitarian Intervention missions.8 4
C. Liberia

-

We contrasted the S.C. reaction to the Somalia crisis in 1993 to its
stance on the more than decade-long civil war that has plagued Liberia
subjecting Liberian citizens to ongoing, draconian rule under one
oppressive regime after another.8 5 Unable to broker a peace on its own, the
Organization ofAfrican Unity encouraged and then requested involvement
from the international community, specifically seeking help from the
United Nations. 86 In the meantime, world aid organizations struggled to
support half a million refugees and thousands of displaced, starving and
sick Liberian citizens suffering the effects of a devastating war.' In 1992,
the United Nations finally passed a resolution authorizing an arms
embargo and endorsing the efforts of a military coalition of African states,
the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG).8 8 In 1993, after continued human rights violations, the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established;
it was poorly organized, largely duplicative of ECOMOG and ineffective
as either a peacekeeping or peacemaking mission because the command
structure had little authority to achieve subordination of the fighting
military factions.8 9 Although the conflict was restricted to a single state's
borders, as in Somalia, the reaction from the S.C. was not as swift.9' This
was largely attributed to the "Somalia Syndrome," which has since caused
82. Id. at 64.
83. See generally id.; Lodico, supra note 16, at 1028.
84. Lodico, supra note 16, at 1028-29.
85. Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 851; see also RoY GUTMAN & DAVID RIEFF, CRIMES OF
WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOw 230-35 (1999).
86. Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 851.
87. Id. at 859.
88. Id. at 860.
89. Id. at 861-62; see also GUTMAN& RIEFF, supra note 85, at 230-35; see also Judith Miller,
U.N. Monitors Accuse SierraLeone Peacekeepers of Killings, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 12, 1999, at A12.
90. Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 851-62 (Nanda details efforts ofthe United Nations which
seem to indicate a desire not to provide effective Chapter VII assistance, but rather to delegate to
ECOWAS, ECOMOG forces and the Organization of African Unity.).
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a sharp decrease in U.S. support for Humanitarian Intervention missions
in Africa.9
Liberian citizens had hoped for a reprieve from the bloodshed when
they elected Charles Taylor, the leader of a dominant rebel group, to the
presidency in 1997.92 Unfortunately, they were hopelessly wrong as Taylor
continued in the footsteps of his predecessors - taking advantage of his
authority and committing heinous atrocities against dissidents. 93 In June
2003, when President Taylor was in Ghana for peace talks, a rebel attempt
to stage a military coup was thwarted. 94 Then in July 2003, images of
corpses of Liberian civilians killed during the violence of the attempted
coup and then piled up in a massive heap in front of the U.S. Embassy in
Monrovia were broadcast around the world; and still, the United Nations
and African regional forces were reluctant to become involved. 95
Subsequently, under intense international pressure to stop the bloodshed,
Taylor was finally forced into exile in Nigeria and the international
community hoped that the fighting rebels would now put down their
arms.96
Hopefully the successes gained by the removal of Taylor will not
become contaminated by the lack of a commitment on behalf of the
international community to help establish a lasting peace in Liberia.
Already, there are reports of renewed outbursts of violence in Liberia since
Taylor's exile.9 7 The first peacekeepers to arrive have come from the
91. Fergal Keane, Yet Again, We Choose to Ignore Butcheryin Africa; 'IRemember Visiting
A Hospital In Sierra Leone and Being Sick at the Sight of the Wounds,' THE INDEPENDENT

(London), May 6, 2000, at 3 (this is also termed the "Mogadishu line").
92. Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 852.
93. Annan: Liberia Needs Peace Force, CNN.coM/WORLD, Saturday, June 28, 2003
[hereinafter Annan], available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/06/28/iberia.
monitors/index.html (last visited May 24, 2004); Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 851; Jeremy Levitt,
HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in
LiberiaandSierraLeone, 12 TEMP. INT'L& COMP. L.J. 333, 342-44 (1998); Stephen Ellis, War in
West Africa, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 33, 35 (2001).
94. Liberia Coup Bid Fails- Sources, CNN.cOM/WORLD, June 5, 2003, at http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/06/05/liberia.coup/index.html (last visited May 24, 2004); Annan,
supra note 93.
95. Peter Takimbudde, Where the Arms Come From: Liberia, INT'L HERALD TRM., Sept. 17,
2003, at 8.
96. New Bid to Stop LiberiaBloodshed, CNN.COM/WORLD, June 10, 2003, at http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/06/10/liberia.fighting/index.html (last visited May 24, 2004).
97. Global Policy Forum, Sept. 17, 2003, Global Policy Forum - U.N. Security Council,
20 03 0
/ 917
Nations United in Discontent, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/clusterl/
discontent.html (last visited May 24, 2004); U.N. News on Africa, Liberia: UN Humanitarian
Envoy Callsfor End to SporadicFightingin Northeast, Sept. 10, 2003, at http://www.un.org/esa/
africa/UNNewsAfrica/sporadic.htm (last visited May 24, 2004); Takimbudde, supra note 95
(writing that fighting continues between the pre-exile fighting factions. The writer is the executive
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Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
even though nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have challenged the
human rights record of these peacekeepers. 98 In any case, whatever
peacekeepers there are currently in Liberia, their number is far from
adequate to enforce a cease-fire agreement between the two rebel groups
and the newly formed transitional government. 99 Therefore, NGOs have
been pleading for additional peacekeeping forces to encourage the rebel
groups to maintain the fragile peace that is currently in place in Liberia.' 00
Although the international community should applaud the work of
peace negotiators and diplomats that have brought Liberia this far, the
United Nations should still try hard not to ignore the current plight of
Liberians, especially at this crucial moment in Liberian history, when there
finally seems to be real progress being made toward stabilizing the country
that has been plagued by bloodshed and turmoil for nearly fifteen years.
Should the rebel groups be unable to maintain a cease-fire on their own,
the United Nations must not miss its opportunity to then immediately take
initiative to help the Liberian people - the victims of a prolonged,
horrendous brutality, and in the process, attempt to restore some of its lost
legitimacy by making such a strong commitment to a lasting peace.
D. Rwanda
Unfortunately, Liberia was not the first time the S.C. considered
sending a Humanitarian Intervention mission only after much reservation
and massive loss of life. In Rwanda, the United Nations was mainly
concerned with promoting a cease-fire agreement between the Hutu
Rwandan government and Tutsi guerrillas.101 In furthering this goal, the
United Nations established the United Nations Assistance Mission
(UNAMIR), whose mission was to provide short-term peacekeeping

director of Human Rights Watch and calls upon the international community, especially the Bush
administration, to send peacekeeping troops.).
98. Colum Lynch, Rights Activists Worriedby African Peacekeepers, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,

2003, at A10.
99. Takimbudde, supra note 95.
100. Fareed Zakaria, Take the Lead in Liberia, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 2003, at 35.
101. Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 848; see generally POWER, supra note 53.
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operations. 12 UNAMIR failed to bring lasting peace to Rwanda.1 03 Instead
of trying other avenues to stabilize Rwanda and the region around it, U.N.
members faltered.10 4 When, in 1994, the death of President Habyarimana
unleashed one of the worst massacres in the Twentieth Century, the United
Nations took no immediate action; it instead reduced UNAMIR forces and
embarked on a long debate at the U.N. Headquarters in New York about
what action it was willing to take.' 05 In the meantime, perhaps as many as
eight hundred thousand Tutsis were being slaughtered.10' The S.C.
authorized the French government to lead a Chapter VII mission known
as "Operation Turquoise" only after the genocide took at least half a
million lives.' 07
E. Haiti
In the same year that Hutus were slaughtering Tutsis, the United States
led a Chapter VII Humanitarian Intervention mission to restore Haiti's
democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 08 The Chapter
VII mission proved to be successful in overthrowing the military junta.1 09
However, the international community questioned the motives for the
S.C.'s intervention into Haiti's internal conflict that posed no military
threat to its neighbors." 0 Was the S.C.'s intervention prompted by a pure
motive to restore Aristide's legitimate constitutional government of Haiti,
or was it prompted by a desire to prevent the impending refugee crisis that
would confront its U.S. neighbor?"'

102. Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 849.
The UNAMIR plan consisted of four phases. First, the U.N. would establish a
broad-based transitional government in Kigali. Second, the armed forces would
be demobilized and integrated. Third, the U.N. would expand and monitor the
Demilitarized Zones .. . throughout Rwanda and along the Rwanda-Uganda
border. Fourth, the mission would terminate with nationwide elections in Rwanda.
Id.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id
Id
Id. at 849-50.
Id at 846; see also Lodico, supra note 16, at 1028-30; POWER, supra note 53, at 327.
Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 850-51; see also Lodico, supra note 16, at 1043-45; see

also HENRY J. STEINER & PHILLIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,

POLmcS, MORALS 652 (2000).
108. Lodico, supra note 16, at 1043-45; Lillich, supra note 48, at 9-11.
109. Id at 1045.
110. Id. at 1044-45.
111. Id at 1044-45; see also Gordon, supra note 10, at 558.
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The S.C. justified its Chapter VII intervention because the junta
subjected the Haitian people to human rights abuses.1 2 By recognizing the
coup leaders as illegitimate rulers of the state of Haiti who had committed
gross human rights violations, the S.C. was able to label the internal
conflict in Haiti as a situation that was "a threat to peace and security," and
thus trigger its Chapter VII powers."' By asserting humanitarian concerns
for its intervention in Haiti, the S.C. was able to proclaim to the world its
pure motives for its intervention." 4 But could the S.C.'s humanitarian
motive be simply a cover up for a selfish motive - to assist one of its

powerful permanent members, the United States, in curbing the refugee
crisis created by massive flights of Haitian citizens to the U.S. coast?" 5
The success of the S.C.'s intervention has been somewhat tarnished by
accusations that support for Humanitarian Intervention came only as a
result of an impending crisis presenting itself at the Florida border, a
territory within the jurisdiction of a permanent member of the S.C., the
United States."'
112. Mahalingam, supranote 28, at 255; see also Kevin Ryan, Rights, Intervention, and SelfDetermination, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 66-67 (1991); Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 842
(stating that "after Aristide's overthrow by a military junta, widespread human rights abuses
ensued. Over 3,000 Haitians were murdered, and others were raped, arbitrarily arrested, and
tortured.").
113. Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 256-57, 259-60. In refusing to recognize the coup leaders
as legitimate rulers of Haiti, the S.C. was able to circumvent U.N. Charter Art. 2(7), which prohibits
any intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the state
except when Chapter VII powers must be applied. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. It seems that S.C.'s
Resolution 940, authorizing the use of"all necessary means" by a multinational coalition to restore
the Aristide government in Haiti, represents the view of the international community
that a democratically-elected government was more legitimate and preferable to
a military junta.... [T]he threshold for a breach of peace and security, and hence,
Chapter VII treatment, has been liberalized. The presence of an humanitarian
catastrophe itself can trigger Chapter VII treatment even where the actual threat
to other States is not particularly strong.
Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 258-60; see also Nanda et al., supranote 61, at 845.
114. Ryan, supranote 112, at 66-67 (The S.C.'s motive to intervene in an internal conflict
must be "pure," i.e., the S.C. should only intervene under its Chapter VII powers in order to stop
the most egregious violations of the fundamental rights of the people. "An intervention which, in
reality, is designed to achieve the selfish purposes of the intervening party - e.g., to rid itself of
an annoying, belligerent, or merely uncooperative neighbor, or to establish any vision of world
order . . . is unjustified.").
115. Id. at 67; Lodico, supra note 16, at 1044-45; see also Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 842.
116. Lodico, supra note 16, at 1044-45.
Many Haitians sought to flee, creating a politically volatile situation in the United
States. The result was a flood of refugees heading toward the southern Florida
borders, creating a calamity of refugee policies from summarily returning the
refugees to containing them at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This ensured that the
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F. Sierra Leone
Perhaps legitimacy is lost in view of the fact that the S.C. did not order
a Humanitarian Intervention mission into Sierra Leone. Like Haiti, the

conflict began when a democratically elected president was ousted from
power."' In May 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the
Revolutionary United Front (R.U.F.) forced President Ahmad Tejan

Kabbah into exile after only a year in office." 8 The rebel leader, Foday
Sankoh, was waging an ongoing campaign of butchery against civilians,
code-named "No Living Thing."" 9 Men, women and children were shot,
disemboweled or mutilated by having limbs hacked off.1 20 Women and
children were also subjected to constant sexual abuse such as gang rape
and sexual slavery.1 21 Since the rebel forces financed their terror campaign
United States would have a direct interest in finding a solution to the crisis in
Haiti.
Id.; cf Teson, supra note 53, at 359-60.
If one asks why the atrocities affected U.S. interests, a plausible answer is that the
national interest as defined in a broader sense, and not just in terms of pure
national egoism was affected precisely because the atrocities were morally
intolerable. One could reply that the U.S. national interest was affected by the
flow of Haitian refugees into U.S. territory. This is certainly true but only means
that the United States had a self-regarding motive in addition to its humanitarian
motives.
Id.; see also Ryan, supra note 112, at 67.

117. See Barbara Crossette, In West Africa, a Grisly Extension of Rebel Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 30, 1998, at Al; Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore
Democracy:InternationalLegal Implicationsofthe ECOWAS Interventionin SierraLeone, 14 AM
U. INT'L L. REv. 321, 325 (1998).
118. Crossette, supra note 117; see also Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 117, at 325 (stating
that Kabbah was elected in the "first free elections ... in over thirty years").
119. Crossette, supra note 117.
[The rebels] would mutilate the people ... writ[ing] things like "No election" or
"Don't vote" on peoples' backs - they would burn it in. The idea of chopping
someone's hands off. . . came from rebels saying to people: We're going to cut
your hands off so you can't vote. ... [The rebels] want to put themselves back on
the political chessboard . . . [and] to do these horrible things to civilians . . . it
makes the civilian population subservient.
Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 89 ("[R]ape of females, including children, was a
'standard practice' of the rebels.. . . [V]irgins ... mostly aged 12 to 15 'were ordered to reporteach
night for sexual abuse by the commander and his men."'); see also Victoria Brittain, Sierra Leone
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by selling diamonds in exchange for weapons, they were able to continue
their terrorization of the civilian population, so long as they controlled the
diamond mines in the Eastern region of Sierra Leone.' Thus, the Sierra
Leoneans' only hope was the Nigerian-led West African regional force
known as ECOMOG. However, some have questioned the true motive
behind ECOMOG's presence in Sierra Leone.' Reports indicate that
Nigerian troops also committed atrocities against Sierra Leoneans similar
to those committed by the rebels, thereby tarnishing their official
mission.1
It appears that after the U.S.-led forces failed to bring peace in Somalia,

the Western states now favor the creation of any type of African army as
long as it is an all-African army, regardless of whether it can actually
restore peace, so long as no Western soldier's blood is spilled in this or

Haunted by 'Silent War Crimes, 'GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 16, 2003, at 21 ("Sexual violence has
remained a silent war crime in Sierra Leone"); see also Tim Butcher, UN SierraLeone Troops
Accused of 'Systematic 'Rape, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), at 18 ("Women were used by all sides
as chattels, kidnapped from their homes ... and forced to act as sex slaves ... as well as domestic
maids.").
122. Crossette, supra note 117.
123. David Hecht, West Wades into African War, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONrrOR, Jan. 21,
1999, at World 6 ("Nigeria's interest in Sierra Leone is widely believed to be diamonds....
Nigeria's stated objective is to show itself to be a superpower in the region, deserving of a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. . . . [Thus,] ECOMOG has not remained neutral in
conflicts."
124. Miller, supra note 89.
A United Nations human rights mission has charged that regional peace-keepers
in Sierra Leone have summarily executed dozens of civilians. . . . the mission
describes systematic rights violations by both insurgents and
ECOMOG [] of executing groups
peacekeepers. ... The report accuses ...
including children . . . The report says that ECOMOG forces bombed civilian
targets, shot at "human shields" formed by the rebels and mistreated the staffs of
the Red Cross and similar groups.... the mission observed "numerous incidents
of ill treatment" of people whom ECOMOG soldiers detained at checkpoints.
Punishments included "whipping, beating, varying types of public humiliation,
and being bound extremely tightly."
Id.
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any other African conflict.12' Thus, is the S.C.'s inaction in Sierra Leone
simply an illustration of the racial biases of the S.C. members? There are
some in the international community who hold such a view.12 If so, is the
S.C. once again a paralyzed body as it was during the Cold War?'" Then
what good is the United Nations if it is unable to intervene in the very
atrocities which it was created to stop? 28
For Sierra Leoneans, the U.N.'s inaction is a sign of betrayal.1 29 Instead
of intervening militarily to disarm the rebel troops and bring them to
justice, the United Nations preferred to negotiate what soon became a
flawed peace plan."` 0 This supposed peace plan brought the "butchers into
the government" despite the fact that the R.U.F. was a murderous army

that chopped off hands and legs, beheaded the people and burned them
alive.' 3 ' Furthermore, there is evidence that the conflict's supposed savior,
125. Hecht, supra note 123 ("ECOMOG fits with US policy in Africa," as well as with the
foreign policies of other like-minded Western states; "Western states want an African army to
defend their interests"); see also Miller, supra note 89. The fact that ECOMOG was able to restore
President Kabbah's civilian government, a little more than a year after a 1997 military coup had
overthrown it, appeared to be enough for the organization to win support of the Western states. This
was despite the fact that rebels still remained active outside the capital and controlled the state's
only asset - its diamond mines - and despite confirmed reports that ECOMOG forces had
themselves committed human rights atrocities. This suggest that Sierra Leoneans are just not
important enough for the Western states to use their resources to defend them. See Crossette, supra
note 117.
126. Longworth, supra note 51, at IC (questioning if the United Nations has a duty to correct
"any human-rights violations, or only the worst ones? Who decides? The United Nations? Ifthe UN
refuses to act, what then? If Kosovo, why not Rwanda or Sierra Leone? Are we committed only to
saving Europeans, or white folks?" Although Longworth refers to the United States specifically
here when stating "we," the same can be applied to all the U.N. members, especially to the
members of the S.C. Likewise, when Longworth states that "[i]f the United States is the world's
only superpower . .. [is it then] the world's police force, or only the leader of other like-minded
nations?," this language can also be applied to the United Nations as a whole due to the language
in the Preamble and Chapter I of the Charter. By looking back when the U.N. S.C. chose to
intervene and when it did not, it appears that "America and its allies" have no desire to intervene
in totally "alien terrain, where Western intelligence is poor," and where the chance of success,
according to them, is slight, at best, like in Rwanda, SierraLeone, Liberia, Sudan and Gujarat. Such
selective intervention only confirms the view of some states that some "great powers act only in
their own self-interest, and that no coalition of nations can successfully collaborate for purposes
as weak as ideals and values" and that other great powers would not act at all and would simply
leave "the world problems ... to local folks to sort out").
127. Id. ("[T]he UN Security Council, which is the only UN body that can authorize
interventions" seems to be "held hostage by the veto power of the five permanent members [when
it] refuses to act." But is it? Maybe the S.C. is simply using the excuse of the veto power held by
the five permanent members to cover up its unanimous intention not to intervene where its
members have nothing to gain, or where success is unlikely or can only be achieved at too high a
cost for them in terms of lives and equipment.)
128. Id.; see also U.N. CHARTER pmbl., ch. 1.
129. Keane, supra note 91.
130. Id.
131. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

19

502

LAW
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OFLaw,
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Vol. 16, Iss.
2 [2004], Art. 6

[Vol.

16

ECOMOG, also perpetuated similar human rights abuses against the Sierra
Leoneans. 3 2 For Sierra Leoneans, the U.N.'s preference for negotiations
instead of military intervention simply meant that their lives are not worth
saving. 3 3 After all, a military intervention would have only required a few
132. Id. ("President Kabbah had no choice but to accept killers in his cabinet as part of the UN
brokered peace agreement." This action really answers the question of whether the S.C. is "willing
to go to war in Sierra Leone?" in the negative. This is partly due to the losses that American and
Pakistani U.N. troops suffered in Somalia. The peacekeepers in Somalia became just another target
for the feuding clans, and the "Mogadishu line" that this incident caused has since inhibited the S.C.
from intervening in subsequent similar conflicts like in Rwanda, Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Kosovo, Sudan and Gujarat, all of which are, according to S.C., internal conflicts to be locally or
regionally resolved.); see also Steven Mufson, Sierra Leone 'sPeace Succumbs to Its Flaws, WASH.
POST, May 8, 2000, at A01. In Sierra Leone, the peace accord was flawed because President
Kabbah was forced by peace negotiators to sign a peace accord with the leader of RUF, Foday
Sankoh, that
gave Sankoh amnesty within Sierra Leone for war crimes committed ... [a]nd it
gave the RUF eight cabinet posts, including control of the diamond mines, the
main source of foreign exchange earnings. "Instead of dealing with a guy who
obviously committed war crimes, they cut him a deal and put him in charge of
diamonds in the hope that he'd steal enough to keep himself happy," said [former
U.S. ambassador Dennis] Jett .... "With a guy like that, I don't think you can
expect his good faith and integrity to live up to his part of a bargain...." Sankoh
dared to break the flawed peace pact because of the flawed U.N. peacekeeping
force, which he does not fear. U.N. peacekeepers ... are not meant to keep the
peace. They mostly monitor peace. They carry guns they are never meant to fire.
When warring factions vjolate peace accords and begin to fight, then U.N.
peacekeepers turn into spectators ... Although the United Nations gave its Sierra
Leone peacekeepers the mandate to shoot back and use force, giving them the will
... is another matter.
Id. This issue of mustering political will to defend the people in faraway lands, such as Sierra
Leone, against human rights abuses, was raised by then-Republican presidential candidate George
W. Bush, who "cast doubt whether he would ever send U.S. troops to Africa." Id. He stated that
"[w]e should not send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide in nations outside our
strategic interest." Id. Vice President Gore also urged "selective engagement in regional conflicts"
stating that "America can not be the world's policeman." Id.; see also Brutal Leader Who Said:
"I'm God" (stating that Foday Sankoh died on July 29th, 2003), CNN.coM/WORLD, July 30,
2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/07/30/sierra.sankoh.profile/index.html (last
visited May 24, 2004).
133. For that matter, the life of any African. Keane, supra note 91 (stating that, in Sierra
Leone, one option is for the world to "get out fast and look the other way while the rebels take
power and slaughter all around them."); see also DAVID RIEFF, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: BOSNIAANDTHE
FAILURE OF THE WEST 140-44 (1995) ("[T]he West does not actually want to be a policeman."
Although Rieff refers to Bosnian Muslims, who were white and European, the same is especially
true for the Africans who are mostly black and non-European. Bosnian Muslims used to say, "I
can't understand why you don't do anything for us . . . [w]e are not Africans, we are civilized
Europeans just like you! . . . Bosnians of all stripes seemed unable to accept [the] thought that
nobody cared." Bosnian Muslims could not comprehend that "there was no intervention in Bosnia
. . because the Western powers did not care enough about Bosnia's fate to sacrifice the lives of
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thousand troops, inevitably comprised, in part, of Western soldiers, backed
up by high tech weaponry to halt the rebels. 3 4 In the absence of a military
effort, how then can there be any talk of post-tragedy justice if it appears
that the United Nations is unwilling to take even some risk in order to save
large populations?"1 5
We are unable to arrive at a logical conclusion as to why a
Humanitarian Intervention mission was not ordered in Sierra Leone when
we discovered that the S.C. did act with deliberate speed to restore Haiti's
president, but merely endorsed military sanctions to restore Sierra Leone's
democratically elected president. We thus pondered the question: ifSierra
Leone had been in fleeing distance ofa state with veto power on the S. C.,
would the mayhem have draggedon for so long?
G. Bosnia
Yet another cause of controversy surrounds the gross violations of
fundamental human rights committed against the Bosnian Muslims and
Kosovars, which occurred after the breakup of Yugoslavia. The civil wars
that erupted, in part due to the historic volatility of the Balkan region,
revealed a casebook illustration of an immediate threat to international
peace and of an actual breach of peace.1 36 The S.C. would have been
justified in ordering a Humanitarian Intervention mission because of the
even a few of its soldiers." This language that Rieff uses to refer to Bosnian Muslims is equally
applicable to Sierra Leoneans because if the United Nations did not care enough to intervene to
defend the white Europeans, Bosnian Muslims, it was highly unlikely that it would intervene to
defend Sierra Leoneans, people that are farther away and that looked and acted differently than the
people of the western states, especially those of the S.C. members.); Mufson, supra note 132.
Sierra Leone was a place of no strategic significance, and instead of sending a
massive NATO military force to rout the rebels, the international community sent
negotiators and then a hodgepodge of U.N. peacekeepers to collect the rebels'
weapons and implement the deal. . . . The Sierra Leone fiasco . . . calls into
question the will of world powers to stop atrocities in distant lands and highlights
a basic flaw in U.N. peacekeeping missions ... [that] peacekeepers can't succeed
if there's no peace to keep.
Id. That is why the U.N. peacekeeping operations failed in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia.
134. Gwynne Dyer, SierraLeone: The End of UN Peacekeeping?, JAKARTA POST, May 16,
2000 ("The Western powers in particular ... remain reluctant to commit their ground forces to
combat because of the intense popular aversion to casualties.")
135. Peter H. Maguire, UNis Weak-Willed in FightingGenocide, Viewpoints, NEWSDAY, July
19, 2001 at A37 ("Trials can never make up for shameful inaction in the face of preventable
genocide."). In the case of Sierra Leone, as of March 2003, there has been no criminal tribunal
established yet to bring the criminals to justice. Is this because the United Nations itself is just as
guilty as the RUF, the perpetrators of human rights abuses, since the United Nations failed to
prevent the preventable for political reasons and thus sanctioned the abuses that the rebels
committed?; see also Dyer, supra note 134.
136. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; see also Gordon, supra note 10, at 570-72.
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impending certainty that the conflict would spill over into neighboring
states, coupled with massive human rights abuses.'" However, due to
lingering Cold War alliances of the permanent members of the S.C., most
notably of Russia, the S.C. was prevented from acting under its Chapter
VII powers."3 8 Thus, in both the Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had to replace the S.C.'39 Although
NATO did not label its mission a "Humanitarian Intervention," it
proclaimed a humanitarian purpose.' 40
H. Kosovo
'

4
Whereas in the case of Bosnia, NATO acted under the S.C. mandate,1
in Kosovo, in 1999, NATO acted within its own mandate.1 4 2 These two

137. Gordon, supra note 10, at 570-72. The human rights abuses against Bosnian Muslims
included rape camps, concentration camps, and massive bombardments of civilian
targets.... Bosnia-Hercegovina ... presents a classic case of an internal conflict
that is a grave "threat" to international peace and would suggest the kind of
situation where the Council could act to the very limits of its powers, including
forcible and nonforcible enforcement.
Id.
138. See Inocencio Arias, HumanitarianIntervention: Could the Security Council Kill the
United Nations?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1005, 1011-12 (2000).
[A] split in the Security Council - and the resulting gridlock created by the veto
power of the Permanent Members - places any international intervention, no
matter how apocalyptic the outrage being committed, in legal quicksand. Let us
not forget that the prohibition against intervention is not absolute; the Security
Council may authorize it in certain situations . . . [t]he Security Council has
exercised this option during upheavals in certain geographical regions, or when
refugees threaten to flow into neighboring countries. . . . When the Security
Council fails to act, due either to the threat or the actual exercise of the veto
power, the United Nations appears to be wavering or passive. Consequently, the
reputation of the United Nations is damaged.... A future of recurring vetoes by
the "Great Ones" ... which would represent a return to Cold War-like patterns,
might not be tolerated by long-term international public opinion. The erosion of
the foremost duty of the United Nations .. . could be the coup de grace for the
United Nations.
Id.
139. Id. at 1012 ("Despite the obvious seriousness of the matter in Kosovo, the split between
Permanent Members in the Security Council kept the United Nations from acting, which in turn,
led to NATO's intervention without the blessing of the Security Council."). See generallyNanda
et al., supra note 61, at 840-41.
140. See Brown, supranote 16, at 1704-06.
141. Nanda et al., supranote 61, at 840-41 ("The [Security] Council ... authorized air power,
in response to which NATO conducted air strikes").
142. Arias, supra note 138, at 1006 ("NATO [] intervention . .. was engineered outside the
realm of the United Nations, and thus in violation of the rules of the U.N. Charter"); Brown, supra
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cases show how the lingering Cold War alliances should yield to the noble
goal of eradication of human rights abuses around the globe. The U.N.
Charter's purpose and the S.C.'s role as a protector of human rights and
dignity are inconsistent with political alliances to the contrary.1 43
As you know, controversy centers around the argument that NATO's
response was illegal, however justified, in light of the balance created
between Articles 2(4) and 2(7) and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter."4
Controversy also centers on the realization that a strong and steady
response is forthcoming when the victims are European, yet there is no
similar response on the African and Asian continents, where the death toll
is constantly on the rise, but the victims are not European. 4 5 This leads
many to question whether racism wields the arms of protection, leaving
brown citizens of the world community in serious peril when caught in the
middle of an armed conflict.'14
I. Sudan
In Bosnia and Kosovo, Humanitarian Intervention was quick in
coming, at least from regional forces, while in Sudan over two million
people have died and five million have been internally displaced or
become refugees.' 4 Yet the United Nations still ignores the cries of
abducted women and children forced into slavery, often sexual slavery; the
note 16, at 1724 ("[S]tates wielding the veto privilege [made] it impossible for the Security Council
to act"); Lodico, supra note 16, at 1046 ("The United States and European countries would not
have received authorization from the Security Council despite a series of resolutions condemning
the situation, so it was necessary to develop an alternative collective mechanism under the
NATO.").
143. Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 251-52 ("During the Cold War, the superpower conflict
restrained the U.N. from taking meaningful action."). Mahalingam then states that since the fall of
the Soviet Union, "[t]he U.N.'s paralysis has ... ended." Id. at 252. However, the cases of Bosnia
and Kosovo illustrate how that may not be so. Since internal conflicts currently seem to be the
biggest threat to the international community, it seems that now, it is more crucial than ever before
to have the S.C.'s P5 members shed their selfish self-aggrandizement agendas and unite in the fight
to prevent human sufferings.
144. Arias, supra note 138, at 1006-07 ("[T]hey were noticeably uncomfortable - from a
legal standpoint - with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ('NATO') intervention"); see also
Brown, supra note 16, at 1688.

145. Longworth, supra note 51.
146. See generally Lodico, supra note 16.
147. U.S. Department of State, The Outlookfor Peace in the Sudan, Report to the President

of the United States from John C. Danforth, Special Envoy for Peace, Apr. 26, 2002 [hereinafter
Danforth Report], at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rpt/10150.htm (last visited May 24, 2004);
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and
Representatives, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, Report by Gaspar Biro, Special

Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 114(c),
U.N. Doc A/48/601 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Special Rapporteur Report], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/e0afl I60ef9e578I cI 256a0f003e6920?
Opendocument (last visited May 26, 2004).
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cries of young boys forced to pick up arms and fight; the cries of activists
imprisoned without charges, tortured, silenced and executed; the cries of
children forcefully taken from parents; and the cries of a civilian
population slowly starving to death.14
Sudan was plunged into a civil war in 1983, when President Nimeiri
unsuccessfully attempted to impose his government's version of shari'a,
Islamic law, on all of Sudan, including 8.6 million non-Muslims mostly in
southern Sudan.1 49 At this time, the international community was
immersed in the Cold War and U.N. actions were held hostage by Cold
War politics. 5 0 The paralysis of the S.C. prevented the international
community from responding quickly to Nimeiri's policies and addressing
the growing unrest among the Sudanese before the situation was allowed
to fester for twenty years and bring such enormous suffering to the
Sudanese.
The southern Sudanese were represented in the civil war by the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which was fighting for selfdetermination and against a regime seeking to impose autocratic religious
rule."' A faction called the National Islamic Front (NIF) gained political
clout and military power in the north as the civil war raged on. 52 The NIF
148. Question of the Violation ofHuman Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part

of the World, Situation ofHuman Rights in the Sudan, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Gerhart
Baum, U.N. ESCOR, 59th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/42 (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 Special Rapporteur Report], at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/
TestFrame/898215e39269a2a3cI256cd3004ba3d8?Opendocument (last visited May 26, 2004).
149. DeJuan Bouvean, A Case Study ofSudan and the Organization ofAfrican Unity, 41 How.
LJ. 413, 416-22 (1998) (The entire population of Sudan is approximately 26 million people);
William L. Saunders, Jr. & Yuri G. Mantilla, Human Dignity Denied: Slavery Genocide, And
Crimes Against Humanity in Sudan, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 715, 718-21 (2002). Sudan,
approximately one quarterthe size of the United States, gained independence from Britain in 1956.
Approximately 2/3 of the population located in the north was Arab or Muslim and the remaining
1/3 located in the south was composed of black African tribes practicing animism or Christianity.
Even as far back as 1956, the Muslims of the north and the non-Muslims of the south maintained
strained relations. Immediately after independence, the Sudan government mandated the reading
of the Koran in the south, nationalized missionary schools and imposed other arbitraryregulations
to hinder the practice and promulgation of non-Muslim religions. With fomenting unrest already
present, President Nimeiri imposed shari'a law in 1983 and thereby sparked the present war, with
the population of the south struggling for self-determination and that of the north seeking to impose
their cultural, political and religious ideology.
150. DRINAN, supra note 5, at 6.
151. 1993 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 147, at 8; Bouvean, supra note 149, at 41621. All factions in Sudan are guilty of human right violations, however, the Arab Muslims commit
by far the most violations. Additionally, as a government actor sponsoring the violations, the NIF
has a greater responsibility to and is better able to address the human rights violations and
implement policy likely to end these violations. See also Human Rights Watch, Briefingto the 59th
Session ofthe UN Commission on Human Rights: Sudan, at http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/sudan.
htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2003).
152. Saunders & Mantilla, supra note 149, at 719; Peter Woodward, Islam and Politics, in
SUDAN SINCE INDEPENDENCE 5 (1986).
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was unhappy with Nimeiri because he was not as extremist as they would
have liked him to be in imposing their version of Islamic rule on all of
Sudan.'" Thus, in 1989, the NIF staged a military coup overthrowing
President Nimeiri and taking control of the entire Sudanese government
in Khartoum." 4 From the beginning, the NIF government engaged in a
systematic campaign to eliminate all dissent, whether political or religious,
including attacks against other Muslim groups that did not embrace the
extremism of the NIF government.' 5 5 While both SPLM and NIF have
committed human rights violations in the on-going Sudanese civil war, it
is a duty of the NIF, as a state actor in control of the government, to
protect civilians.' 5 6 Instead, the NIF persistently engages in summary
executions, uses the military and government-owned equipment to raid
villages, murders adult males and takes women and children as slaves.'"
Reports detail common occurrences of government armies entering
villages, killing all adult males, rounding up women and children and
marching them northward towards the capital where they would be sold as
1 5 Young girls
slaves or traded for cows and camels."
are often forced into
9
sexual slavery.' Also, one minister has reported how he "interviewed
women and children and heard stories of youngsters who saw their parents
slaughtered, and women who endured unimaginable sexual abuse,
including forced genital mutilation.""'0 After capture and sale, the black
African slaves are then systematically stripped of their identity and
females are raped and subsequently forced to bear their master's
children.' 6
In 1989, after massive flooding escalated the devastation from the civil
war, the international community finally began to take notice of the plight
of the Sudanese - and the United Nations initiated Operation Lifeline
Sudan (OLS) in response to 200,000 starvation deaths.6 2 Despite a
153. Saunders & Mantilla, supra note 149, at 719.
154. Bouvean, supra note 149, at 418.
155. See generally Bouvean, supra note 149; Saunders & Mantilla, supra note 149; 2003
Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 148.
156. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 149.
157. 1993 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 147, at 5.
158. Bouvean, supra note 149, at 423-24.
159. Steven Wales, Remembering the Persecuted:An Analysis of the InternationalReligious
FreedomAct, 24 HoUS. J. INT'L L. 579, 626 (2002).
160. Id. at 627.
161. Bouvean, supra note 149, at 426. Arabs purchasing Black Africans immediately begin
the demoralizing process of "Arabizing" the person. The slave is given an Arab name, forced to
learn and speak only Arabic and live in conformity with the laws of the religious autocratic rulers.
Id. at 423-24.
162. Ted Dange, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis,
Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy, Issue Brief for Congress, Library of Congress, Order
Code IB98043, Updated Jan. 23, 2003, Congressional Research Service at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/17342.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004).
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glimmer of hope for the Sudanese provided by such humanitarian aid, the
NIF government's terror campaign continued.16 3 The NIF government
bombed OLS aid distribution centers, thereby preventing food from
reaching civilians in southern Sudan - just one of many illustrations of
the NIF's effective and frequent use of food as a weapon against its
dissenters.'" It took the United Nations four years after its initial
humanitarian aid to Sudan to finally commission Gaspar Biro in 1993 as
Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights to Sudan.1 65 Biro
eventually resigned, frustrated by the slow and inadequate response by the
United Nations to the atrocities in Sudan.' 6 6 As late as 2003, both NGOs
and the U.N. Special Rapporteur still cry out for an increased U.N.
involvement.'16 While the sense of urgency might not come naturally in
the posh offices of the U.N. building in New York, perhaps a little urgency
is due when, for southern Sudanese, every day is a struggle between life
and death.
Thus, even today, twenty years later, the bloodshed continues.16 8 The
NIF government continues to wage war not only on SPLM and other
fringe militias, but on civilians as well.1 69 The United Nations is acutely
aware of the human rights abuses in Sudan.1'70 Scores of reports from the
Special Rapporteur and volumes of U.N. Resolutions condemning Sudan
speak to the awareness of the United Nations of the ongoing tragedy and
suffering."' Perhaps legitimacy is lost when it appears that the United
Nations choose to find the souls of black Africans in Sudan are just not
worth the U.N.'s involvement? Is it perhaps because Sudan has oil
reserves on which international investors are spending significant
exploration and development dollars?7 2 Many of these investors see Sudan
as an inexpensive source for obtaining crude oil and subsequently boosting

163. Bouvean, supra note 149, at 421.
164. 1993 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 147; Saunders & Mantilla, supra note 149,
at 723.
165. 1993 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 147.
166. Saunders & Mantilla, supra note 149, at 724.
167. 2003 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 148, at 3, 20; see generally http://www.hrw.
org and http://www.amnesty.org. A search of the web sites for Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International for the word "Sudan" produces numerous documents calling for some type of U.N.
response to the crises in Sudan.
168. See generally Wales, supra note 159; Saunders & Mantilla, supra note 149; Bouvean,
supra note 149.
169. 2003 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 148.
170. 1993 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 147.
171. Id.; 2003 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 148. We highlighted these two reports
from our research because they represent the earliest report and the latest report, respectively, on
the U.N. web site.
172. Amnesty International, Canada, Oil and Sudan, Terror Trade Times, at http://web.
amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/ttt3_canada (last visited May 24, 2004).
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investors' portfolios.' As in Sierra Leone, perhaps the "Somalia
Syndrome" has provided a convenient fagade behind which the
international community has been able to evade its international
responsibility of preserving the basic human rights of those in Sudan.1 4
When evaluating the disparity in intervention decisions, illustrative of the
notion that the "Somalia Syndrome" is only a fagade is the fact that

interventions have occurred only where there were interests of a particular
state at stake.' 5 Here, economic concerns - that is, possible new oil
sources, deep pocket oil company money and political loyalty - are the
driving force behind the U.N. disinterest in the plight of the oppressed
Sudanese.1'7 6 Some of the U.N.'s member states with major corporations
doing oil business with the NIF government include China (PetroChina),
Canada (Talisman Oil and Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company),
Sweden (Lundin Oil), Malaysia and Italy."7 These companies often profit
at the peril of the Sudanese people who are forcibly removed from their
property to make way for government oil projects.'
Overall, the United Nations has done little more than study the ominous
situation in Sudan in order to offer it some humanitarian aid and
negotiation assistance.' 9 By July 2002, the two sides, brought together
under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
in Kenya, managed to come to an agreement on some issues of religion
and state, self-determination and free humanitarian access.' 80 By October
2002, the two sides had even worked out a cease-fire agreement. 8 1
However, unlike in the cases of Somalia and Liberia, in Sudan, there were
no blue helmets on the horizon to help ensure compliance with the ceasefire agreement and so fighting commenced once again in January 2003.12
173. Wales, supra note 159, at 625-26; Amnesty International, supra note 172.
174. See supra Parts III.B & III.F (case studies of Somalia and Sierra Leone in this Open
Letter).
175. See supra Part III (for all case studies in this Open Letter).
176. Wales, supra note 159, at 625-26; Amnesty International, supra note 172.
177. Wales, supra note 159, at 625-26; Amnesty International, supra note 172. Sources are
strangely quiet about the American corporate involvement. However, many of the international
petroleum companies listed in the text do trade on Wall Street. These corporations and governments
that deal in Sudanese oil supply the NIF with war money.
178. Wales, supra note 159, at 625-26; Amnesty International, supra note 172.
179. A search at the U.N. web site at http://www.un.org results in scores of resolutions,
reports, studies and statements issued by the United Nations regarding the human rights abuses in
Sudan.
180. Human Rights Watch, supra note 151; Statement from the Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, Secretary-GeneralWelcomes Sudan Peace Talks Being Held in Kenya, Press Release, Apr.

9, 2003, SG/SM/8845, AFR/696, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8845.doc.htm
(last visited May 24, 2004).
181. Human Rights Watch, supra note 151.
182. See supra Parts III.B & III.C (case studies of Somalia and Liberia in this Open Letter);
2003 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 148, at 18 (The Special Rapporteurcalls on the United
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In light of the absence of any meaningful commitment to nurturing a
lasting peace in Sudan, and the total failure of the several ad hoc shortterm rescue attempts by the United Nations and regional bodies, truly, the
most successful intervention thus far seems to be that of the Black
Ministerial Alliance, which has managed to send three people to Sudan to
redeem 6700 slaves for $33 US each.'1 3
Two million Sudanese have been slaughtered.'" Two million is more
deaths than the deaths in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda combined.' 5 How
many more will die while the United Nations merely discusses this human
catastrophe? Is it that two million black African souls, when weighed
against economic interests, political capital and maybe even the life of a
white soldier, are just not worth saving?
J. Gujarat, India
We find even more discouraging the cases where there is an absolute
lack of protection, whether regional or via a Chapter VII initiative. This is
the case of Gujarat, India, where on February 27, 2002 violence exploded
after a gang of Muslims burned a boxcar with fifty-eight Hindu activists
inside, an incident known as the Godhra attacks. 8 6 The Hindu activists
were returning from the Gujarati town of Ayodhya where they sought
construction of a Hindu temple on the disputed site of the Babri mosque
destroyed by a Hindu activist a decade earlier.18' In retaliation for the
Godhra attacks, Hindu citizens terrorized Gujarat's minority Muslim
population on a six-week killing and torture campaign.' While a heavy
concentration of carnage took place within a period of seventy-two hours
in Ahmedabad, Gujarat's largest city, daily communal violence still held
a steady pace for three months after the initial slaughter.18' These scenes
of carnage are not new to Gujarat, the birthplace of the beloved Gandhi,
which has suffered periods of occasional violence since 1969.190
Nations to become politically involved in addition to being involved with humanitarian issues);
Human Rights Watch, supra note 151.
183. Wales, supra note 159, at 626. Some critics say that groups such as this only bolster the
trade and do little for long-term change. Perhaps the 6700 redeemed souls might think differently.
184. Saunders & Mantilla, supra note 149, at 715.
185. Id. at 736.
186. GujaratMuslim Women "Rape Victims, " BBC News, Apr. 16, 2002 [hereinafter Rape
Victims], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1933521.stm (last visited May 24, 2004).
187.

'We Have No Orders to Save You': State Participationand Complicity in Communal

Violence in Gujarat, Human Rights Watch Report, Apr. 2002, Vol. 14, No. 3(C) at 13 [hereinafter
Human Rights Watch Report], at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/gujarat.pdf (last visited
June 7, 2004).
188. Id.
189. Jill McGivering, Gang Violence in Gujarat, BBC News, Apr. 26, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/1953437.stm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
190. Sanjeev Srivastava, Analysis: Why is Gujaratso Violent?, BBC News, Sept. 25, 2002,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/1856049.stm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). In 1969, when
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The latest communal violence followed a public campaign of hatred
that infiltrated public schools and streets via anti-minority propaganda
which was sponsored by the reigning political party, known as the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).' 9' Gujaratis were called on to rid their
the subcontinent divided into India and Pakistan, approximately 2,500 Gujaratis were killed in
clashes between Hindus and Muslims, followed by clashes in the 1980s and again in 1992, after the
Babri Mosque in the Gujarati town of Ayodhya was demolished. Between 1992 until 2002, antiChristian violence sometimes erupted in tribal areas so that it is doubtful how tranquil was this socalled decade of peace. See id.
191. Anna Bigelow, Hulladiya Hanuman: The Return or the End ofHistory?, Social Science
Research Council/Contemporary Conflicts, at 2, at http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/gujarat/biglow/pf/
(last visited May 26, 2004). The readiness of Gujarat's residents to murder, maim, mutilate, rape,
torture, and expel their minority neighbors also thrives within the public education curriculum. The
BJP began a campaign to encourage national pride, and in doing so, reportedly relied on the RSS,
a propagandist organization funded by Hindu nationalist networks.
The current Minister for Human Resources Development, Murli Manohar Joshi,
is not only a former pracharak, or regional leader, of the RSS but also was present,
and visibly jubilant, at the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in 1992. Under his
leadership, this Ministry, which includes the Department of Education, has sought
to standardize the addition of Vedic mathematics and astrology to the course list.
Id. Gujarati public education textbooks teach high school students about the "valorous" strides that
Germany accomplished in racial pride and prosperity under Nazism, while never mentioning the
Holocaust. These students are also encouraged to ponder current social plagues, the subjects of
which are minority citizens. At the University level, students are taught that outside religions in
India are simply colonizing measures imposed by political and military opportunists, which should
be resisted. See also Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 43 (stating that the goal of
the RSS is to place anti-minority propaganda on the streets and inside the classrooms).
A 1999 Human Rights Watch report documented the August 1998 distribution of
fliers by RSS and Hindu Jagran Manch (HJM)-an offshoot of the sangh parivar
consisting of people who belong to the Bajrang Dal - in Dangs district in
southeastern Gujarat, site of a ten-day spate of violent and premeditated attacks
on Christian communities and institutions between December 25, 1998 and
January 3, 1999. The fliers proclaimed, "India is a country of Hindus.... Our
religion of Rama and Krishna is pious. To convert [or] leave it is a sin." Another
flier by the VHP in Bardoli, Gujarat, warned, "Caution Hindus! Beware of
inhuman deeds of Muslims.. . . Muslims are destroying Hindu Community by
slaughter houses, [sic] slaughtering cows and making Hindu girls elope. Crime,
drugs, terrorism are Muslim's empire." A flier produced by the Bajrang Dal and
VHP in November 1998 described the Bajrang Dal as a "wide organisation of
youth," "working under the Vishwa Hindu Parishad," with the objectives of
"protect[ing] mother India," "rais[ing] a loud voice. against people who ignore
Hindu Sabha [assembly]," raising people's awareness against the "trapping of
Hindu girls by Muslims and anti-national activities of Christian missionaries," and
working for the "protection of religion and culture." A parallel anti-Christian
campaign was supported by the Gujarati-language press that printed false reports
of Hindu temples being destroyed, cited an increase in the percentage of Christians
in the area, printed announcements for upcoming rallies, and repeatedly branded
Christians as the main instigators ofviolence in December 1998 and January 1999.
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neighborhoods of minorities and thereafter victims were burned alive,
hacked to death, maimed and raped. 9 2 In addition, their possessions were
either confiscated or destroyed.1 93 The gruesome details reveal that family
members were forced to watch the beheading and torture of their loved
ones before they themselves were killed.'9 4 Women were especially
targeted, many of whom were gang-raped by public officers and rioters
before being burned alive.'9 5 The police itself would physically, verbally
Id. at 43-44.
192. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 3; see generally An Interim
Report to the National Human Rights Commission, People's Union for Civil Liberties, Mar. 21,

2002 [hereinafter PUCL Interim Report], available at http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Religioncommunalism/2002/gujarat-nhrc-submission.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
193. PUCL Interim Report, supra note 192, at 5 ("Today, there is practically no Muslim
property in non-Muslim areas undamaged by the loot and arson").
194. Id. at 8-9.
195. Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 16, 27-28 (citing the observations of
Harsh Mander, "Cry, the Beloved Country: Reflections on the Gujarat Massacre," South Asia
Citizens' Web, Mar. 13, 2002. Mandar observes:
I have never known a riot which has used the sexual subjugation of women so
widely as an instrument of violence as in the recent mass barbarity in Gujarat.
There are reports everywhere of gang-rape, ofyoung girls and women, often in the
presence of members of their families, followed by their murder by burning alive,
or by bludgeoning with a hammer and in one case with a screw driver. Women in
the Aman Chowk shelter told appalling stories about how armed men disrobed
themselves in front of a group of terrified women to cower them down further.
Id.; see also Panelfor the Initiativefor Justice in Gujarat, The International Initiative for Justice
in Gujarat: An Interim Report, Dec. 19, 2002, available at http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/

gujarat/report/pf/ (last visited May 24, 2004).
The use of systematic rape and sexual violence as a strategy for terrorizing and
brutalizing women in conflict situations echoes experiences of women in
Bangladesh in 1971, and in countries such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Algeria. In
Gujarat, as in all these other countries, women have been targeted as members of
the "other" community, as symbols ofthe community's honor and as the ones who
sustain the community and reproduce the next generation. This has become an all
too common aspect of larger political projects of genocide, crimes against
humanity and subjugation. In Gujarat, sexual violence against Muslim women as
well as against women in inter-religious marriages is central to the organized
political project of Hindutva. During our visit, we have been struck by the explicit
use of male sexuality as the mechanism and mobilising tool for recruiting
members for the "cause" and as a means of imposing "Hindu" dominance upon
the Muslim community. We find chillingly unique the incitement to sexual
violence as a means of proving the masculinity of the "Hindu" man, as reflected
in the political propaganda of the forces of Hindutva prior to, during and after the
violence in February/March 2002 and as carried out through patterns of men
stripping and exposing themselves to women in an aggressive and threatening
manner, and committing acts of mass rape and burning of victims.
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and sexually abuse women who only sought refuge and would even drag
the women from shelter to parade them through the streets and beat
them.' 6 Perhaps pregnant women suffered the worst fate, as their bellies
were sliced open, the fetuses removed and burned before the mothers were

finally killed.1 97

The death toll rose to as high as two thousand, which incidentally,

equals the estimated death toll in Kosovo before NATO's response.1 98 In
addition, the Indian government estimates that 98,000 more became
refugees living in relief camps run by NGOs.1 99 NGO reports put the
refugee numbers at 150,000.200 These refugees fear returning to their
homes, knowing that they are members of a despised minority group. 201
Sharp criticism surfaced as subsequent reports indicated a high level of
state complicity, not only in the propaganda leading up to the carnage, but
in the actual violence itself.202 Eyewitness accounts tell of officers standing
by as women were gang-raped and burned alive. 203 Also, riot members
Id.
196. PUCL Interim Report, supra note 192, at 6.
In Bahaar colony of Ajwa Road, women went out to request the police to set up
a police point as tension had been increasing in the face of violence. The police
refused to listen to the women and in fact, laathi charged to force them into their
homes. At Rain Basera, Machchipith, under Karelibag Police Station, several
women were assaulted by the police during the "combing operations." Four
policemen entered the'basti at around 3:00 pm on March 16, 2002, and started
beating them indiscriminately Sairaben Shaikh, Faridabanu Shaikh,
Hamidabibi Pathan, all aged between 30 and 45 were among those who were
beaten so badly that their wounds are still visible. Faridabanu was hit on her chest
by a laathi, and Hamidabibi in her pubic region. In Bahaar colony, women were
pulled out of their homes by dragging them by their breasts. Even 18 year old girls
were not spared - they were threatened with swords and sticks by the police.
Rukiabibi, a 70 year old woman in Kasamala Kabristan, who went out to prevent
the police from taking away her young son, was hit by the laathi so hard that her
head split open.
Id.
197. Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 28.
198. Jill McGivering, Gujarat's Muslims Live in Terror, BBC News, May 9, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1977246.stm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
199. Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 6.
200. McGivering, supra note 189.
201. Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 59.
202. McGivering, supra note 189.
203. Id.; see also PUCL Interim Report, supra note 192, at 15 (reporting that a few residents
of the town of Sama went to appeal to the Councillor of their region for peace. The Councillor
claimed that he could do nothing.).
He ranted at length about the unpatriotic and criminal nature of the Muslim
community (such as for instance their habit of abducting Hindu girls), and dwelt
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were spotted inside police stations during the carnage and public officers
refused to broker a peace. 2 4 During the bloodiest days in Ahmedabad,
between February 28th and March 2nd, reports indicate that the
perpetrators were all dressed in khaki shorts and saffron scarves, which is
a signature of the nationalist factions, hindutva, in addition to carrying
weapons and explosives that those of the nationalist factions carry.205
These groups, which carry the banner of the hindutva ideology, are
actually sponsored by the BJP.20 6
Supporters of this ideology reach all the way up to the Prime Minister,
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who reportedly waited until hundreds lay slain
before commanding his party not to concentrate on how to stop the
violence, but rather to investigate who started the pogrom. 207 Vajpayee did
not even visit Gujarat until thirty-six days after the attack at Godhra and
the riots that followed.2 08 His entourage consisted of controversial and
incendiary players, such as Central Minister Uma Bharati, who issued
inflammatory speeches in support of the demolition of the Babri mosque
in 1992.209 Vajpayee could have censured the Gujarati government under
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution on the grounds that the government
would not maintain law and order, yet he refused.2 10
on the desirability of Muslims going and living in "their own areas (ilakhas)." He
also produced a list which, he explained, showed the voting patterns ... in the
most recent assembly bye-election, and how Muslim localities had voted against
the BJP. On being repeatedly asked whether he could assure that there would be
no further violence in the area, he replied that he could not do so, and one of his
associates explained that what had happened that day (Feb. 28th) was "only a
sample," and that it was best to be prepared for what would follow the next day.
Id.
204. See supra text accompanying note 203.
205. Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 22.
206. Bigelow, supra note 191, at 1. Research indicates that the BJP is behind the extreme
nationalist factions that call for the purging of all non-Hindu elements, an ideology known as the
Hindutva movement. See also Paul R. Brass, The Gujarat Pogrom of2002, Social Science Research
Council/Contemporary Conflicts, at 4 (The BJP party signature rally is of support for Hindu
political unity, at the expense of disenfranchising Muslims and Christians by supporting violent
outbreaks against both groups), available at http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/gujarat/brass/pf/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2004); see also Srivastava, supra note 190, at 3. The previous minister, LK Advani,
stamped his commitment to extremist Hindu nationalism when he concentrated resources on
replacing Islamic monuments with Hindu temples. His hinch-man was Narendra Modi, who has
succeeded to his term and is reported to have encouraged the mobs in the most recent outburst of
violence. With such hard-line factions in the government of Gujarat, Hindu nationalist movements
such as Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the World Hindu Council, were able to find support from those
in power.
207. Bigelow, supra note 191, at 1; see also Brass, supra note 206, at 4; Srivastava, supra note
190, at 3.
208. Brass, supra note 206, at 3.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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At the local level, perpetrators were equipped with computer printouts
identical to those furnished by the municipal authority. 2 ' The printouts
provided the names and addresses of the dwellings and proprietorships of
Muslim inhabitants. 212 It appears that the press was also focused on a
systematic campaign to eliminate the Muslim population; the publications
printed in the Gujarati language embellished stories and issued directives
to Hindus to avenge the deaths of those who were murdered in the boxcar
tragedy. 1 3
Perhaps the most controversial regional figure in this massacre is

Narendra Modi, the right-wing Chief Minister of Gujarat and a member of
Vajpayee's BJP. 214 British intelligence sources indicate that the massacre
was premeditated with the aid of public officials. 2" Amid the controversy,
the BJP party tried to reduce international criticism by claiming that the
violence was contained and a purely local problem. 2 16
Refuting that statement are reports which indicate that at least twentysix major towns suffered the spill-over effect of the worst massacres,
which took place in the city of Ahmedabad and which were carried out
systematically.2 " Intelligence reports confirm that the massacre was statesponsored terrorism aimed at purging a religious minority group from a
majority Hindu state.2
Reports also indicate that since the attacks, the victims have been
denied equal protection under the law, which contrasts with India's
profession that it is the world's largest democracy. 2 19 Government officials
who gather First Information Reports, which are the preliminary
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Brass, supra note 206, at 3.
A leading Gujarat newspaper, Sandesh, featured a front-page headline on February
28, "Avenge Blood with Blood," above a story concerning a statement from the
VHP. Sandesh and GujaratSamachar featured many other false and incendiary
stories in the following days, some of which virtually encouraged Hindus, in areas
where violence had not yet spread, to kill Muslims.
Id.
214. Srivastava, supra note 190, at 3; see also Gujarat Vote in Indian Parliament, BBC News,
Apr. 23, 2002 [hereinafter Gujarat Vote], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1945421. stm
(last visited May 24, 2004).
215. UK Report Censures Gujarat Chief Minister, REDIFF.coM, Apr. 27, 2002 [hereinafter
UK Report], at http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/apr/27train.htm (last visited May 24,2004).
216. Gujarat Vote, supra note 214, at 2.
217. Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 22.
218. UK Report, supra note 215. A review of UK intelligence sources ultimately resulted in
the censure, whereby "British officials claimed the violence had all the 'hallmarks of ethnic
cleansing'.. .the riots 'far from being spontaneous, were planned possibly months in advance and
were carried out by an extremist Hindu organization with the support of the state government."'
219. Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187, at 6.
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eyewitness accounts that victims must file, have left the names of the
accused perpetrators out of the reports.2 Those who were successfully
pinpointed in the reports were seldom arrested and public pressure was
intense to reduce the severity of the charges."' Meanwhile, false charges
were issued against young Muslims who were picked up while forces
searched through the remnants of the destruction. 2 Other Muslims faced
innocuous charges while mob members went free at the peril of poor,
innocent, migrant Hindu workers, who police rounded up in large numbers
to show that arrests were being made. 2 3 As for the thousands living in
relief camps, their survival has been placed, for the most part, in the hands
of Muslim charity groups and NGOs.22 4
Considering the extent of the loss of life, damage to property and spillover effect, we feel that this "humanitarian crisis," as William H. Lash III,
a U.S. Commerce Department official, has termed it,225 might have been
met with some response by the S.C. Whether attention would have come
in the form of a peacekeeping mission, humanitarian mission, or other
U.N.-sponsored initiative is unknown. While parties may disagree as to the
level of U.N. involvement that should have come immediately in the
aftermath of the Ahmedabad violence, the S.C. should have at least taken
the preliminary step of authorizing a fact-finding mission. We did consider

whether the absolute lack of a response was justified since most of the
violence occurred solely within India's borders. 226 However, we find the
sovereignty argument less potent in light of the fact that the violence in
Somalia and Haiti was also contained within a sovereign's borders.2 27 In
light of all these cases, we struggle to find consistency in the response to
very similar conflicts. Sometimes the response is swift, yet at other times
lagging and inept, and even, on occasion, nonexistent.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
PUCL Interim Report, supra note 192, at 7.

While Muslims are arrested under several and manifold sections, the Hindus are
arrested under innocuous sections, such as violating curfew timings. In order to
show that Hindus are arrested in large numbers, the police has [sic] resorted to
arresting innocent and poor Hindus. In Indira Nagar, Makarpura, on March 17,
2002, migrant workers from Bihar who were enjoying their Sunday afternoon naps
were dragged away from their homes by the police, whereas those Hindus who
were part of the mobs on the rampage have yet to be arrested.
Id.
224. Id
225. GujaratSituation is a 'HumanitarianCrisis,' REDIFF.COM, May 6, 2002, at http://www.
rediff.com/news/2002/may/06train7.htm (last visited May 25, 2004).
226. See generally Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 187.
227. See supra Parts III.B & III.E (Somalia & Haiti case studies).
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IV. "REGIO-COPS" AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ARE "REGIOCOPS" TAKING OVER THE U.N.?

When the initiative is left up to regional actors, we find that the
protection is far from adequate. The NATO response in Kosovo leads
some scholars to question why similar protection has not been deployed
to other people where the U.N. has not reacted with a Chapter VII
initiative.22 8 While it is true that regional protectionism was at work in the

Kosovar, Liberian, Rwandan, and Sierra Leonean conflicts, the strength of
each regional system was not the same. 22 9 We sense that NATO is able to
act with greater precision, oversight and speed than coalitions such as
ECOMOG because of greater economic power. The context within which
NATO is operating is different from that of ECOMOG and similar
regional defense networks. Individuals living under the umbrella of the
latter regional systems are building their economies and political
infrastructures, which were so exploited during colonial rule. These brown
victims who inevitably live beyond NATO's reach are exposed to a fate
where the death toll is much greater because they do not have the type of
equipment and manpower to guarantee greater protection. It appears on the
surface, at least, that if these citizens are not living in close enough
proximity to powerful entities they are in the most vulnerable position on
the globe, left to fend for themselves - ignored.
We question whether the United Nations has passed the torch onto
"regio-cops" to accomplish the purpose of the U.N. Charter.2 30 Some
scholars maintain that human rights violations are best left to regional
policing because they are more familiar with the political landscape.2 1' Yet
others maintain that it is dangerous to assume that geopolitical
arrangements are better equipped to stop violations, because to do so is to
provide a convenient window through which powerful states may enter
with less noble goals.23 2
We seek to understand if these regional initiatives are legitimate or
rather extralegal. Clearly there are exceptions to Article 2(4)'s deference
to sovereignty. For instance, Article 51 gives members a right to react
militarily in the absence of S.C. approval if there is a need for individual

228. See Lodico, supra note 16, at 1029 ("Although the rebels' rampage in Freetown killed
as many people in just a few days as the Serbs killed in one year in Kosovo, the international
community did not undertake any NATO-like response.").
229. Different regional coalitions were at work in each conflict.
230. Voon, supra note 9, at 67.
231. Weisburd, supra note 19, at 272.
232. Richard Falk, The ComplexitiesofHumanitarianIntervention: A New World Challenge,
17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 510 (1996).
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or collective self-defense.2" Otherwise, the S.C. can make an investigation
to determine if there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression," and if all the peaceful remedies have been exhausted, it
may then intervene." 4 If regional networks do intervene, they must

proceed with the authorization of the S.C. pursuant to Article 53, otherwise
they would be in violation of the U.N. Charter.2 3
If regional coalitions constantly circumvent these provisions, they

erode the legitimacy of the United Nations. Regional coalitions' intentions
may be noble, although we cannot say for sure, and while the outcome
may prove beneficial, there is no justification for violating legal
obligations to restore the rule of law.2 36

V. SCHOLARS' ANALYSIS: THE "LEGAL STANDARDS" APPROACH
After investigating some of the cases in which Humanitarian
Intervention has or has not been employed, we turned our focus towards
scholars who have addressed solutions to the problem of inconsistencies
in the use of power. We then paused and envisioned ourselves in the
difficult role of policymakers and considered our own solution. We
imagined the intense pressure we would face, knowing that people's lives
were at stake. Yet, not without hope, we realized, that equipped with our
legal training we might find a way to lay the foundation for a solution.
Addressing these inconsistencies is a worthy analysis because the
legitimacy of the United Nations is questioned when there is the
perception that protection and peace are at the mercy of political agendas,

233. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

234. Id. art. 39.
235. Id. art. 53.
236. Reppas, supra note 25, at 480.
It has been suggested that due to the change in the world political arena in which
nation-states become major players, the value and use of the United Nations may
slide. If this happens, the G-7 or another similar group may fill a void left by the
United Nations and emerge as the increasingly autonomous and dominant
decision-maker, without the Charter and answerable to none other than its own
members. The United Nations, however, remains the only meaningful
organization in the world that can legitimately act for the betterment of mankind
as a whole.... [T]he United Nations plants the seed for future intervention;
without this initial participation, that seed might never have been planted at all.
Although altruism and politics can never go hand in hand, the United Nations
remains our best hope of making this world free for all its peoples. We must do
everything we can to fashion the United Nations into a world policeman of human
rights violations. The future of the United Nations is the future of mankind.
Id. (citations omitted).
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rather than existing pursuant to the honorable purpose of promoting basic
human rights as outlined in the U.N. Charter. 23 7

We have evaluated the different criteria for Humanitarian Intervention
and have discovered that many scholars favor applying the "legal
standards" approach. The following are the most often cited standards set

forth by scholars wishing to provide a legal framework to justify
Humanitarian Intervention. Professor Bertram Brown maintains that a
humanitarian necessity should be present.2 38 Necessity at a minimum
"would need to be quite serious and widespread in order to approach this
critical threshold. 9 Expanding on this notion, Professor Tania Voon
stresses that quantifying the number of lives lost before an intervention can
occur would be counterproductive. 20 Voon highlighted the case of Kosovo
where intervention followed the death of 2000 people.24 ' She compares
this to the 200,000 deaths that occurred in East Timor before a
Humanitarian Intervention occurred.24 2 Voon points out that in both cases
a public outcry signaled that the scope of the atrocity should be sufficient
to trigger intervention, not mere numbers.23
Professor Malvina Halberstam suggests that instead of maintaining that
a specific body count must be found before intervention can occur, the
danger must be imminent.2 4 This contrasts with Richard Falk who
suggests a standard of great danger and defines great danger as "crimes
against humanity," thereby suggesting that we may rely on an international
legal definition.24 Most of the language we found puts the threshold fairly

high, with such terms as "massive violations of human rights," "genocide

237. Judy A. Gallant, Humanitarian Intervention And Security Council Resolution 688: A

ReappraisalIn Light of a Changing World Order, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 881, 892 (1992)
("The Charter's preamble expresses the determination of the members to uphold essential human
rights and to make certain that armed force is only utilized for the collective good"); see also
Sellen, supra note 40, at 248-49 ("Promoting respect for the Security Council's authority is most
important; respect is a prerequisite to effectiveness. Therefore, the United States should promote
United Nations operations, and maintain its channels of communication").
238. Brown, supra note 16, at 1726.
239. Id. at 1727.
240. Voon, supra note 9, at 65; see also Burton, supra note 24, at 449-50.
241. Voon, supra note 9, at 64-65.
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also Burton, supra note 24, at 449-50 (1996) (citing Michael J. Bazyler,
Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea

and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 597, 599-600 (1987) (stating that although "intervention should
not be predicated upon some minimum body-count, the legitimacy of intervention rises in
proportion to the death toll")).
244. Halberstam, supra note 26, at I ("First, there must be a threat of imminent death or grave
injury").
245. Falk, supra note 232, at 503.
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or gross violations," "severe humanitarian crisis, ""ethnic cleansing," "loss
of life on a massive scale," and "shocks the conscience." 24 6
Next, we found support for the notion that there must be a requirement
of proportionality. 247 Professor Ruth E. Gordon articulates that the level of

intervention should be "commensurate to the evil it seeks to curtail." 48
Gordon further illustrates that the standard of proportionality should be
such that troops should not use more or less force than necessary to
accomplish the humanitarian goals. 24 9
Perhaps when domestic interest is nonexistent, Humanitarian
Intervention is less likely to occur, as illustrated by the Rwandan, Liberian,
and Sierra Leonean conflicts.25 While a pure human rights motive is the
ideal, some scholars indicate that it is not possible to completely eliminate
all private interest in the conflict.25 ' The reality is that the smaller states
with little or no private interest that do recognize these injustices are
militarily and financially incapable of suppressing them; therefore, the
world community has no choice but to call on the great military powers to
intervene, albeit for their own domestic interests. 22 The superpowers that
do intervene must be careful not to put their private interests above the
cost of human lives.2 3 Therefore, Humanitarian Intervention does not
always follow private interests, but private interest can be found in
Humanitarian Interventions." 4 It has been argued that one way to assure
that a state's interests are more closely aligned with humanitarian
246. Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 827; Lodico, supra note 16, at 1029; T. Modibo Ocran,
&

The Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L

COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002); Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 263; Richard B. Lillich, Kant and The
Current Debate Over HumanitarianIntervention, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 397, 398 (1997).
247. Brown, supra note 16, at 1729.
248. Gordon, supra note 28, at 45; see also Nanda et al., supra note 61, at 827.
249. Gordon, supra note 28, at 46.
250. Adam Roberts, The So-Called "Right" of HumanitarianIntervention, in 3 Y.B. OF INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L., 2000, at 3 (T M C Asser Press, 2001); see also Nanda et al., supra note 61, at
827.
251. Gurtov & Mekjavich, supra note 31, at 509; Voon, supra note 9, at 78-80.
252. Yogesh K. Tyagi, The ConceptofHumanitarianIntervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 883, 890, 897 (1995).
253. Voon, supra note 9, at 79. Voon writes,
[i]nterestingly, it may be impossible to assess the underlying reasons for an
intervention before the event. The extent and range and human rights violations
may not be apparent until foreign troops or international bodies are on the ground,
collecting evidence and witnessing the trauma. .. . Thus, the manner in which
NATO conducted the bombing campaign against the F.R.Y. caused some to
speculate about the NATO's other motive for the interventions, such as "keeping
NATO alive" or testing new military weapons.
Id. (citations omitted).
254. Id. at 76.
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objectives is by looking at that state's own human rights record.2
Obviously, if the intervening power's record is poor in its own jurisdiction,

its resources will only be wasted. 256 This is well illustrated by an old
American proverb: "people in glass houses should not throw stones."
Halberstam contravenes the notion that we must limit private interest and
instead focuses on the end result. 25" So long as the intervention rectifies the
problem, it deserves the title of "Humanitarian Intervention."2 1'
Falk argues that the presence of anarchy is yet another standard that
should be present to declare a legitimate intervention. 25 9 When the state
lacks the characteristics of a state, such as an active government,
intervention based on humanitarian objectives would not conflict with the
principle of sovereignty. 260 The logic follows that Humanitarian
Intervention is justified in situations where there is a lack of civil order
that has the potential to translate into a substantial loss of life. 26 1 In
addition, Ravi Mahalingam maintains that there is a history associated
with intervening when the sovereign authority has deteriorated, which, in

turn, lends more legitimacy to the standard requiring anarchy or

governmental collapse.2 62
Even in the absence of anarchy, however, supporters of standards
maintain that unwillingness on the target state's part to stop the atrocities
is another indicator that intervention is needed.263 The scholars argue that
the independence of the state is not violated simply because the interveners
attempt to bring humanitarian aid to its people. 2 ' The legitimacy that is
lost is not that of the intervening power, but of the state that is incompetent
or incapable in the face of tragedy.26 5
In addition, before an intervention is deemed legitimate, all peaceful
alternatives should be exhausted. 266 However, this exhaustion of remedies
should not drag out while the death toll rises.267 Clearly, this requirement
seems straightforward, but it can be difficult to effect it in practice.2 68
There is no standard set in stone that dictates when a diplomatic effort has

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 80.
Halberstam, supra note 26, at 2.
Id.
Falk, supra note 232, at 502-03.
Tyagi, supra note 252, at 887.
Ocran, supra note 246, at 8-9.
Mahalingam, supra note 28, at 225.
Scheffer, supra note 17, at 288; see also Tyagi, supra note 252, at 890.
Halberstam, supra note 26, at 4.
Tyagi, supra note 252, at 887-88.
Roberts, supra note 250, at 36-37.
Scheffer, supra note 17, at 291.
Roberts, supra note 250, at 36.
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been exhausted and an intervention is inevitable. 269 Perhaps this type of
standard is therefore most susceptible to political manipulation and so less
likely to be applied consistently.2 7
An offshoot of this standard is consent. Gordon points out that consent
is rarely obtained because once consent is given, the mission, by
definition, is no longer an intervention.27 ' Also, Professor Adam Roberts
illustrates the paradox in obtaining consent when consent is granted by a
target state only when faced with a threat of military intervention. 27 2
Although consent is advocated, scholars still maintain that consent is
merely preferable and should not be an ultimate barrier to intervention
when human rights are at stake.27 3

Finally, a recurring theme on the subject of standards is based on the
principle that the target state should be better off as a result of an
intervention.2 7 4 Scholars do not specify a clear measure by which we can

determine whether a state is better off but simply provide that at least some
level of improvement should exist.27 5 This contrasts with the current postSomalia U.S. guideline, as articulated by Yvonne C. Lodico, that there
must be a guarantee of total victory before a Humanitarian Intervention
can be initiated. 276 While it is debatable whether the possibility of absolute
victory is required or whether merely making an improvement is enough,
it seems the consensus is that at least some progress towards improving
human rights should be made.

269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Gordon, supra note 28, at 45.
272. Roberts, supra note 250, at 37.
273. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 265. Scheffer lays out six reasons for when consent should not
serve as a barrier:
(1) To rescue or protect citizens abroad and other aliens whose lives are at risk. (2)
To protect religious or ethnic minorities from genocide or violent oppression. (3)
To end internal aggression or human rights atrocities. (4) To contain mass
migration of people, to return large numbers of displaced people to their rightful
homes, to repatriate large numbers of refugees and other migrants or to protect
refugees and migrants from life-threatening circumstances. (5) To respond to mass
human suffering caused by man-made or natural disasters. (6) To support antitotalitarian rebellions or other movements of self-determination struggling for
independence from oppressive regimes that violate human rights on a large scale.
Id.; see also Tyagi, supra note 252, at 894-95.
274. Scheffer, supra note 17, at 291; see also Tyagi, supra note 252, at 889.
275. Tyagi, supra note 252, at 894-95; Scheffer, supra note 17, at 265.
276. Lodico, supranote 16, at 1029.
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VI. AUTHORS' PREFERENCE: THE APPLICATION OF A
"PRECEDENT" APPROACH

Due to the difficulties that attend the creation of universally applicable
standards for when and how to intervene on humanitarian grounds, we
believe that precedent should therefore guide the U.N.'s future
Humanitarian Interventions. Member states' disagreement on the basic

definition of the concept of human rights, not to mention that of
Humanitarian Intervention itself, leads us to recommend precedent as a
measuring reed against which member states should decide whether to
intervene or not. Past inconsistencies in the U.N.'s response to egregious
human rights violations warranting Humanitarian Interventions reflect how
politically-charged all U.N. actions are when an intervention is undertaken
the promotion of national interests of the intervening states
predominates over humanitarian objectives. The Bosnian, Rwandan, Sierra
Leonean, and Sudanese disasters, just to name a few, are good illustrations
of how the past practices of the United Nations are simply ineffective and
have only tarnished the U.N. role as a global organ ofjustice.
The precedent approach, however, leaves no room for selective or
inadequate intervention; similar cases call for similar responses. We also
recognize that the common law world's centuries-old reliance on
precedent in the pursuit of consistency, predictability, fairness, efficiency,
and objectivity,2 ' is a great example of the success and continued
importance of the precedent approach in today's world. The precedent
approach in American jurisprudence has a fundamental premise which
states that "a judicial decision of an adjudicated issue, embodied and

explained in an opinion by a judge is a 'precedent' which under the
doctrine of stare decisis ['to stand by the decision'] has the quality of
controlling law for the future."" The value in such an approach is
"fairness among similarly situated persons." 279 When legal principles are
applied across the board with consistency, "we see through the distracting
detail and isolate the essence of disputes so that similarity between
controversies arising among different people in different places and at
different times becomes clear." 28 0 Also, precedent provides the benefits of
277. Samuel C. Damren, Stare Decisis: The Maker of Customs, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
(2000).

1, 2-4

278. RICHARD B. CAPPALU, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD 9 (1997) (citing BLACK,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW (1912), §§ 59-70, 182-221, app. B); see also Todd E. Freed, Is Stare
DecisisStillthe Lighthouse Beacon ofSupreme CourtJurisprudence?:A CriticalAnalysis,570HO
ST. L.J. 1767, 1768 (1996) (stating that a supreme judicial body adhering to prior judicial decisions
to solve current conflicts is known as a horizontal stare decisis, which is different from the vertical
stare decisis, which occurs when the lower courts follow the prior stare decisis of higher courts.
The horizontal stare decisis approach is advocated in this context.).
279. CAPPALU, supra note 278, at 81.
280. Id.
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predictability and stability because when similar cases are treated alike, the
subjects of future controversies are able to predict the outcome and plan
their affairs accordingly. 2
We contend that the same applies to the affairs of political actors in the
international arena. If the S.C. responds to similar conflicts with deliberate
consistency, human rights violators will likely be discouraged by the
deterrent aspect in predictable responses. Furthermore, legitimacy is
established through precedent. Observers of judicial decrees are more
likely to find solace in decisions that contradict the observer's personal
interest, if those outcomes serve a higher purpose than merely satiating the
political will of the ruling elite.2" 2
A good example of this in American jurisprudence is the conservative
U.S. Supreme Court declining an opportunity to overturn the controversial
Roe v. Wade,2 3 a landmark case which has established the principle that
a woman's right to have an abortion is a constitutionally protected right in
America. 28 In Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health,285 the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down certain municipal abortion regulations that
would have inhibited women from accessing abortion clinics. 286 The
conservative members of the Supreme Court, whose political affiliations
did not comport with the principles established in Roe v. Wade,287
nevertheless respected the role of precedent in the American constitutional
jurisprudence. 288 In doing so, they sacrificed their political convictions in
order to aspire to such laudable goals as fairness, objectivity,
predictability, stability, and legitimacy of action.28 9
Would not the use of precedent in the deployment of Humanitarian
Intervention missions lend the same legitimacy to the United Nations? The
application of precedent would mitigate the tendency of political actors to
subjugate human rights to state interests.
The creation of precedent to achieve the aforementioned enumerated
goals within the United Nations would be de jure stare decisis, which is
the result of an officially recognized and celebrated legal exercise. 290
However, there is another avenue that international organizations are
281. Id. at 83.
282. Id. at 89.
283. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
284. Parisis G. Filippatos, The Doctrine ofStare Decisisand the ProtectionofCivil Rights and

Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 335, 355 (1991) (citing Roe, 410 U.S.
at 113).
285. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
286. Id. (citing Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 416).
287. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part

Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1999).
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known to rely on to arrive at a precedent approach, known as the de facto
stare decisis. 29' Perhaps the use of de facto stare decisis demonstrates how
vital the precedent approach is to international judgments. Recent
observations of World Trade Organization's Appellate Body decisions
reveal how the Appellate Body has established some variation of precedent
"in the interests of developing a consistent, coherent, and legitimate body
of jurisprudence."292 We do not make this observation to advocate for the
doctrine of stare decisis as the only appropriate method; but rather we
recognize that the international trade communities rely on precedent and
are willing to employ uncodified precedent-setting methods in the interest
of justice. Why could not then the entire world embrace the precedent
approach in its decision-making process at the U.N. headquarters?
It is important to stress that we likewise do not advocate transplanting
a judicial construct into the nonjudicial branch of a supranational
organization such as the United Nations. However, we do advocate
adherence to the underlying principles that comprise precedent and similar
doctrines. While stare decisis is not necessarily applicable to decisions
made by state actors, the universal principle of legitimacy in action
warrants borrowing from the spirit of such a construct; and, of course,
stare decisis is not the only doctrine under which precedent thrives. In
civil law systems, where stare decisis is not practiced, the doctrine is
adherence to the letter of the code to protect against the tyranny of the
current political landscape. 293 Presumably, civil law justices applying the
letter of the code serve the same purpose as common law justices standing
by the decisions of previous opinions. Both doctrines seem to aspire to
judgments that lend legitimacy through deliberate predictability, insofar
as the final outcome is not a political statement, born of excessive judicial
discretion, but rather a predetermined course. 2 94
Under the precedent approach, action or inaction would not be solely
at the mercy of the political interests of veto-wielding states. A decision
of whether or not to intervene based on precedent can be viewed as
predictable, fair, rational and legitimate since it would encompass similar
past situations, rather than be based on a general subjective set of
malleable standards that are unable to pass the critical muster of the
international community.

291. Id. at 3.
292. Id. at 110 (maintaining that the Appellate Body established a de facto precedent approach
in its proceedings when it applied its "Japan-Alcoholic Beverages" test for what is a like product
under GATT Article III:2 in both the "Korea-Alcoholic Beverages" case and "Canada-Magazines"
case.).
293. David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect ofthe Jurisprudence ofthe International Court

of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 435, 445 (1996).
294. Id.
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The United Nations is now at a crossroads. It can either reassert its
commitment to fighting human rights abuses by making the doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention one of its leading weapons in the fight, to be
deployed upon the happening of certain prerequisite events, or it can let
U.N. legitimacy wither away and allow other organizations to replace it.
If it chooses the former, then past practice and not past principles should
guide its decision to intervene based on humanitarian objectives. The
experiences of the interventions undertaken since the Cold War should be
the platform from which the United Nations proceeds in the future. In
retrospect, past interventions are the best source for re-evaluating the
correctness of the undertaken actions. It is within this framework of past
interventions that the United Nations should attempt to transform itself
into a more powerful, legitimate, global force.
The post-Cold War international order, being replete with internal
conflicts of international significance, has already dismissed the now
archaic concept of a state's absolute territorial sovereignty and the
principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of the state. Human
rights are no longer internal matters but have international significance;
thus, whenever human rights are violated, an intervention to restore respect
for human rights and dignity must be undertaken by the United Nations
without the consent of the target state and based on past practice. In order
for the United Nations to be recognized globally, it must therefore practice
the peremptory norm of "equality before the law."2 95 The only mark of
approval that it must receive is from the victims of human rights abuses
themselves and no one else; only they can honestly appraise the success
of the intervention.
Standards afford none of the benefits of precedent; they are simply
expressions of a compromise among the various political interests of the
member states. Therefore, standards are inherently incapable of
consistently guiding Humanitarian Interventions as give-and-take
diplomacy permits only those interventions that promote the intervener's
ulterior domestic strategic interests.

VII. CONCLUSION

Mr. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Distinguished Members of the
United Nations:
After reviewing the post-Cold War era Humanitarian Intervention
cases, we worry about the continued legitimacy of the United Nations,
especially when the interventions proceeded on an ad hoc, arbitrary, and
295. Dino Kritsiotis, ReappraisingPolicyObjectionsto HumanitarianIntervention, 19MIcH.
J. INT'LL. 1005, 1026(1998)(citing A.V. DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 203 (1885)).
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inconsistent basis. We have confronted and analyzed various opinions
maintained across a wide spectrum of international law scholars. Of
particular concern to us is a belief that decisions to initiate Humanitarian
Intervention missions occur based on the paranoia surrounding the
"Somalia Syndrome," racial criteria and political will. These beliefs have
definitely developed from an objective analysis of the long-standing
pattern of the U.N. involvement in Humanitarian Interventions.
For instance, Somalia and Liberia were countries with no central
authority and gross human rights violations. Though the United Nations
was quick to respond to the Somalian crisis, the casualties suffered by
U.N. troops have since frustrated the willingness of member states to
intervene in like situations such as Liberia.
Response was also quick in coming in Kosovo, after Serbians murdered
two thousand Kosovars. However, in Rwanda, more than half a million
lives were lost before the United Nations decided to intervene militarily.
Moreover, in Sudan, two million have died during a twenty year bloodshed
and the U.N.'s response has amounted to little more than superficial
involvement. Finally, in Gujarat, where the minority Muslim population
was brutalized by factions with questionable government ties, the United
Nations did not respond at all. Such inconsistent responses by the United
Nations to similar atrocities might reflect how the human rights of
Europeans seem more important than those of all others. We acknowledge
that regional organizations with superior military prowess, like that of
NATO, can enforce a cease-fire and save lives more quickly and
effectively than supranational organizations like the United Nations.
People who live beyond these types of regional organizations, and who
coincidentally are not of European descent, are then in grave danger,
especially in light of the fact that the United Nations is not likely to stop
the violence.
In Haiti and Sierra Leone, both crises centered on the fact that a
legitimately elected president was ousted by a military coup. In Haiti, the
refugee crisis was quickly quelled by a U.S.-led multinational
Humanitarian Intervention mission, while in Sierra Leone, the violence
continued to escalate with no sign of blue helmets on the horizon. It seems
that politics was the decisive factor in the U.N. approval of Humanitarian
Intervention.
If the United Nations had a methodology with which to evaluate the
appropriateness of Humanitarian Intervention, these criticisms could be
avoided. One way to address the problem is through legal standards. That
would mean formulating a codified set of rules by which to analyze new
cases. 2 96 However, it is possible that standards, alone, would not suffice
296. See Brown, supra note 16, at 1722-39 (outlining "The Elements of a Legal Standard for
Humanitarian Intervention," including reference to: the role of the Security Council, necessity and
legitimate purpose, proportionality, duty to respect international humanitarian law and human
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because they can be a safe haven for diplomatic language that frustrates
action where action is critical. Precedent may provide the answer.
The theory behind precedent is that past practice provides a lens
through which future cases can be determined. If the S.C. absolves itself
of a humanitarian duty then that would set a bad precedent which could
irreparably mar the reputation of the United Nations, an outcome that those
who favor an international community would not wish to espouse. On the
other hand, when the S.C. exercises its powers to intervene such as in
Haiti, this sets a positive precedent to be followed in similar circumstances
in the future, thereby cementing the United Nations as a legitimate
institution.
An initiative to implement either the standards or the precedent
approach sheds a positive light on the current state of Humanitarian
Intervention. We must find some way to come to terms with past
initiatives, or a lack thereof, and in that effort create a more stable
foundation from which to move forward. Without this foundation, how can
we encourage future generations to trust in the protection that the
international community is professing to provide?

rights, duty not to make a humanitarian situation worse than it otherwise would have been, and
responsibility for reconstruction.).
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